Strategist Otto von Bismarck understood that after unifying Germany in 1871, it had reached its "culminating point of success." He knew any further expansion would trigger a hostile global coalition. His successors ignored this logic, pursued further greatness, and predictably created the very alliance that destroyed them.
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The current era of multipolarity, global economic integration, and tensions between rising and incumbent powers (like China and the US) is more analogous to the early 20th century before WWI than the bipolar Cold War. This historical parallel carries stark warnings about the potential for conflict.
The dynamic between a rising power (China) and a ruling one (the U.S.) fits the historical pattern of the "Thucydides' trap." In 12 of the last 16 instances of this scenario, the confrontation has ended in open war, suggesting that a peaceful resolution is the exception, not the rule.
For generations, Western societies have viewed peace and prosperity as the default state. This perception is a historical outlier, making the return to 'dog eat dog' great power politics seem shocking, when in fact it's a reversion to the historical norm of conflict.
Historically, rising and ruling powers don't stumble into war directly. Instead, their heightened distrust creates a tinderbox where a seemingly minor incident involving a third party (like the assassination in Sarajevo pre-WWI) can escalate uncontrollably into a catastrophic conflict.
The British WWII strategic bombing campaign reveals a core logic of war: success provokes a neutralizing reaction. As British bombing became more effective, Germany reallocated vast resources to air defense and countermeasures. This response ultimately negated the initial British advantage, showcasing the dynamic interplay of action and reaction.
When a political movement is out of power, it's easy to unify against a common opponent. Once they gain power and become the establishment, internal disagreements surface, leading to factions and infighting as they debate the group's future direction.
Citing a historical pattern, the speaker notes that 12 out of the last 16 times a rising power (like China) has confronted a ruling power (like the US), the result has been war. This 'Thucydides Trap' suggests a high statistical probability of military conflict.
Ed Luttwak identifies a recurring historical pattern of self-sabotage. Imperial Germany challenged the British Royal Navy, which protected its global commerce. Today, China challenges the US Navy, which secures the sea lanes vital for Chinese trade. This is a recurring strategic error driven by a misplaced desire for military parity.
When a country is successful for too long, its citizens forget the difficult and often violent actions required to achieve that prosperity. This ignorance leads to guilt, a weakened national identity, and an inability to make tough decisions for self-preservation.
Civilizations don't fall directly from war or plague. They fall when these shocks trigger a psychological shift from an open, exploratory mindset to a fearful, protectionist one. This 'Spartan mentality' stifles the innovation required to overcome the original challenges, leading to decline.
