Citing a historical pattern, the speaker notes that 12 out of the last 16 times a rising power (like China) has confronted a ruling power (like the US), the result has been war. This 'Thucydides Trap' suggests a high statistical probability of military conflict.

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The current era of multipolarity, global economic integration, and tensions between rising and incumbent powers (like China and the US) is more analogous to the early 20th century before WWI than the bipolar Cold War. This historical parallel carries stark warnings about the potential for conflict.

The dynamic between a rising power (China) and a ruling one (the U.S.) fits the historical pattern of the "Thucydides' trap." In 12 of the last 16 instances of this scenario, the confrontation has ended in open war, suggesting that a peaceful resolution is the exception, not the rule.

For generations, Western societies have viewed peace and prosperity as the default state. This perception is a historical outlier, making the return to 'dog eat dog' great power politics seem shocking, when in fact it's a reversion to the historical norm of conflict.

Historically, rising and ruling powers don't stumble into war directly. Instead, their heightened distrust creates a tinderbox where a seemingly minor incident involving a third party (like the assassination in Sarajevo pre-WWI) can escalate uncontrollably into a catastrophic conflict.

The US won World War II largely due to its unparalleled manufacturing capacity. Today, that strategic advantage has been ceded to China. In a potential conflict, the US would face an adversary that mirrors its own historical strength, creating a critical national security vulnerability.

The core driver of a 'Thucydides Trap' conflict is the psychological distress experienced by the ruling power. For the U.S., the challenge to its identity as '#1' creates a disorienting fear and paranoia, making it prone to miscalculation, independent of actual military or economic shifts.

Viewing China as a "rising" power is incorrect; it's a "reascending" one. For 70% of the years since 1500, China had the world's largest GDP. Its current trajectory is a return to its historical dominance, a framing that fundamentally alters the understanding of its global ambitions.

The "Japan panic" was rooted in fears of economic subordination—like having a Japanese boss or seeing landmarks bought by Japanese firms. In contrast, anxiety about China is dominated by concerns over direct military conflict and a technological arms race, a much starker form of geopolitical rivalry.

A historical indicator of a superpower's decline is when its spending on debt servicing surpasses its military budget. The US crossed this threshold a few years ago, while China is massively increasing military spending. This economic framework offers a stark, quantitative lens through which to view the long-term power shift between the two nations.

The recent uptick in global conflicts, from Ukraine to the Caribbean, is not a series of isolated events. It's a direct result of adversaries perceiving American weakness and acting on the historical principle that nations expand their influence until they are met with sufficient counter-force.

Thucydides Trap: War Occurs in 75% of Conflicts Between a Rising and a Declining Superpower | RiffOn