The 1990s belief that economic liberalization would inevitably make China democratic provided ideological cover for policies that fueled its growth. This hubris, combined with corporate greed, allowed the US to facilitate the rise of its greatest geopolitical rival without achieving the expected political reforms.
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The dynamic between a rising power (China) and a ruling one (the U.S.) fits the historical pattern of the "Thucydides' trap." In 12 of the last 16 instances of this scenario, the confrontation has ended in open war, suggesting that a peaceful resolution is the exception, not the rule.
Unlike the US's focus on quarterly results and election cycles, China's leadership operates on a civilizational timescale. From their perspective, the US is a recent phenomenon, and losing the US market is an acceptable short-term cost in a much longer game of survival and dominance. This fundamental difference in strategic thinking is often missed.
To counter the economic threat from China's state-directed capitalism, the U.S. is ironically being forced to adopt similar strategies. This involves greater government intervention in capital allocation and industrial policy, representing a convergence of economic models rather than a clear victory for free-market capitalism.
China's economic ascent began when Deng Xiaoping invited American experts to teach them about capitalism. This strategy, combined with becoming the world's manufacturing hub, allowed them to learn the system, grow strong quietly, and eventually become a dominant global power.
The US won World War II largely due to its unparalleled manufacturing capacity. Today, that strategic advantage has been ceded to China. In a potential conflict, the US would face an adversary that mirrors its own historical strength, creating a critical national security vulnerability.
The US assumes its democratic values create a trust advantage. However, unpredictable actions, like threatening to cut off tech access to partners, undermine this trust and create an opening for China. China is exploiting this by positioning itself as a more reliable, if not more ideologically aligned, long-term supplier, especially in the Global South.
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, which ignited China’s growth, were based on adopting American free-market principles like private enterprise and foreign capital. China’s success stemmed from decentralizing its economy, the very system the U.S. is now tempted to abandon for a more centralized model.
In trying to compete, the U.S. is mirroring China's protectionism and industrial policy. This is a strategic error, as the U.S. political system lacks the ability to centrally direct resources and execute long-term industrial strategy as effectively as China's state-controlled economy.
The latest U.S. National Security Strategy drops confrontational rhetoric about China as an ideological threat, instead framing the relationship around economic rivalry and rebalancing. This shift prioritizes tangible deals over promoting American values globally, marking a departure from Reagan-era foreign policy.
From 2001 onwards, while the U.S. was militarily and economically distracted by the War on Terror, China executed a long-term strategy. It focused on acquiring Western technology and building indigenous capabilities in AI, telecom, and robotics, effectively creating a rival global economic system.
