A long bull market can produce a generation of venture capitalists who have never experienced a downturn. This lack of cyclical perspective leads to flawed investment heuristics, such as ignoring valuation discipline, which are then painfully corrected when the market inevitably turns.

Despite seeing 100x revenue multiples reminiscent of 2021, VCs are not accelerating their fund deployment or rushing back to fundraise. This more measured pace indicates a potential lesson learned from the last bubble, where rapid deployment led to poor vintage performance and pressure from LPs.

An investor passed on a fund that paid 30-40x revenue for startups, believing quality alone justifies price. Three years later, that fund and its predecessors are underwater. This illustrates that even for great companies, undisciplined entry valuations and the assumption of multiple expansion can lead to poor returns.

The traditional, long-term venture capital cycle may be accelerating. As both macro and technology cycles shorten, venture could start mirroring the more frequent 4-5 year boom-and-bust patterns seen in crypto. This shift would force founders, VCs, and LPs to become more adept at identifying where they are in a much shorter cycle.

The AI boom is masking a broader trend: venture fundraising is at its lowest in 10 years. The 2021-22 period created an unsustainable number of new, small funds. Now, both LPs and founders are favoring established, long-term firms, causing capital to re-concentrate and the total number of funds to shrink.

The ideal period for venture investment—after a company is known but before its success becomes obvious—has compressed drastically. VCs are now forced to choose between investing in acute uncertainty or paying massive, near-public valuations.

The increased volatility and shorter defensibility windows in the AI era challenge traditional VC portfolio construction. The logical response to this heightened risk is greater diversification. This implies that early-stage funds may need to be larger to support more investments or write smaller checks into more companies.

Seed funds that primarily act as a supply chain for Series A investors—optimizing for quick markups rather than fundamental value—are failing. This 'factory model' pushes them into the hyper-competitive 'white hot center' of the market, where deals are priced to perfection and outlier returns are rare.

The past few years in biotech mirrored the tech dot-com bust, driven by fading post-COVID exuberance, interest rate hikes, and slower-than-hoped commercialization of new modalities like gene editing. This was caused by a confluence of factors, creating a tough environment for companies that raised capital during the peak.