The AI boom is masking a broader trend: venture fundraising is at its lowest in 10 years. The 2021-22 period created an unsustainable number of new, small funds. Now, both LPs and founders are favoring established, long-term firms, causing capital to re-concentrate and the total number of funds to shrink.
Unlike past platform shifts that caught many off-guard, the AI wave is universally anticipated. This 'consensus innovation' intensifies all existing competitive pressures, as every investor—from mega-funds to accelerators—is aggressively pursuing the same perceived opportunities, pushing factors like Power Law belief to an extreme.
The current fundraising environment is the most binary in recent memory. Startups with the "right" narrative—AI-native, elite incubator pedigree, explosive growth—get funded easily. Companies with solid but non-hype metrics, like classic SaaS growers, are finding it nearly impossible to raise capital. The middle market has vanished.
Despite seeing 100x revenue multiples reminiscent of 2021, VCs are not accelerating their fund deployment or rushing back to fundraise. This more measured pace indicates a potential lesson learned from the last bubble, where rapid deployment led to poor vintage performance and pressure from LPs.
Y Combinator's model pushes companies to raise at high valuations, often bypassing traditional seed rounds. Simultaneously, mega-funds cherry-pick the most proven founders at prices seed funds cannot compete with. This leaves traditional seed funds fighting for a narrowing and less attractive middle ground.
The seed investing landscape isn't just expanding; it's actively replacing its previous generation. Legacy boutique seed firms are being squeezed by large multistage funds and new emerging managers, implying a VC's relevance has a 10-15 year cycle before a new cohort takes over.
Aggregate venture capital investment figures are misleading. The market is becoming bimodal: a handful of elite AI companies absorb a disproportionate share of capital, while the vast majority of other startups, including 900+ unicorns, face a tougher fundraising and exit environment.
The increased volatility and shorter defensibility windows in the AI era challenge traditional VC portfolio construction. The logical response to this heightened risk is greater diversification. This implies that early-stage funds may need to be larger to support more investments or write smaller checks into more companies.
The venture capital return model has shifted so dramatically that even some multi-billion-dollar exits are insufficient. This forces VCs to screen for 'immortal' founders capable of building $10B+ companies from inception, making traditionally solid businesses run by 'mortal founders' increasingly uninvestable by top funds.
Unlike the dot-com era funded by high-risk venture capital, the current AI boom is financed by deep-pocketed, profitable hyperscalers. Their low cost of capital and ability to absorb missteps make this cycle more tolerant of setbacks, potentially prolonging the investment phase before a shakeout.
AI startups' explosive growth ($1M to $100M ARR in 2 years) will make venture's power law even more extreme. LPs may need a new evaluation model, underwriting VCs across "bundles of three funds" where they expect two modest performers (e.g., 1.5x) and one massive outlier (10x) to drive overall returns.