A long bull market can produce a generation of venture capitalists who have never experienced a downturn. This lack of cyclical perspective leads to flawed investment heuristics, such as ignoring valuation discipline, which are then painfully corrected when the market inevitably turns.
During periods of intense market euphoria, investors with experience of past downturns are at a disadvantage. Their knowledge of how bubbles burst makes them cautious, causing them to underperform those who have only seen markets rebound, reinforcing a dangerous cycle of overconfidence.
The most imprudent lending decisions occur during economic booms. Widespread optimism, complacency, and fear of missing out cause investors to lower their standards and overlook risks, sowing the seeds for future failures that are only revealed in a downturn.
An investor passed on a fund that paid 30-40x revenue for startups, believing quality alone justifies price. Three years later, that fund and its predecessors are underwater. This illustrates that even for great companies, undisciplined entry valuations and the assumption of multiple expansion can lead to poor returns.
The traditional, long-term venture capital cycle may be accelerating. As both macro and technology cycles shorten, venture could start mirroring the more frequent 4-5 year boom-and-bust patterns seen in crypto. This shift would force founders, VCs, and LPs to become more adept at identifying where they are in a much shorter cycle.
Judging investment skill requires observing performance through both bull and bear markets. A fixed period, like 5 or 10 years, can be misleading if it only captures one type of environment, often rewarding mere risk tolerance rather than genuine ability.
A staggering 70% of private credit managers have less than a decade of experience, meaning their entire careers have been in a low-rate, bull market environment. This lack of cycle-tested experience poses a significant systemic risk as market conditions normalize and stress appears.
Timing is more critical than talent. An investor who beat the market by 5% annually from 1960-1980 made less than an investor who underperformed by 5% from 1980-2000. This illustrates how the macro environment and the starting point of an investment journey can have a far greater impact on absolute returns than individual stock-picking skill.
For young professionals in finance, market downturns are the ultimate training ground. Free from portfolio responsibility, they can observe how senior leaders navigate crises and absorb crucial lessons about risk and psychology that are unavailable in bull markets.
In a hyper-growth market where demand is at an all-time high, it's easy to mistake a favorable environment for individual skill. This powerful 'current' can hide significant operational flaws, which only become apparent when the market inevitably shifts, as seen in the ZIRP era.
The institutionalization of venture capital as a career path changes investor incentives. At large funds, individuals may be motivated to join hyped deals with well-known founders to advance their careers, rather than taking on the personal risk of backing a contrarian idea with higher return potential.