Unlike a nuclear attack, for which there is no public protection plan, a detailed biological war survival plan exists. However, it is designed exclusively to ensure continuity of government by protecting a small, pre-selected group of officials, not the general population.

Nation-states are unlikely to develop pandemic-level bioweapons because they cannot easily control them or protect their own populations. The primary threat comes from extremist groups or lone actors who are not motivated by rational self-preservation, a critical insight for threat modeling.

A malevolent actor using a published list of deadly viruses could release multiple pathogens at once from many locations. This would overwhelm medical systems and, most critically, cause societal collapse when essential frontline workers refuse to risk their lives and families for their jobs, shutting down the supply of food, power, and law enforcement.

The Soviet Union's goal with its bioweapons program was not just mass death but also psychological devastation. By engineering pathogens resistant to known cures like antibiotics, they aimed to shatter the American public's faith in its medical establishment, leading to societal collapse.

The true horror of nuclear war isn't the initial blast but the complete breakdown of society. With no government, law, or resources, survivors face a primal, violent struggle for existence amidst sickness and malnourishment, making immediate death a preferable fate.

Deep Vision's plan to publish the genomes of deadly viruses would effectively give the "killing power of a nuclear arsenal" to an estimated 30,000 unvetted individuals with synthetic biology skills. In the bio-age, openly publishing certain information can be a greater security threat than physical weapons.

Stockpiling multi-strain vaccines offers a strategic deterrent. While potentially less effective than a targeted vaccine, they can protect essential workers and military personnel, ensuring society continues to function during an attack. This resilience makes a biological attack a less attractive strategy for an adversary.

"Gain-of-function" research, intended to develop countermeasures for dangerous pathogens, uses the same methods as offensive bioweapon creation. This paradox means that efforts to defend against biological threats inherently increase the risk of creating them, whether deliberately or by accident.

Conventional explosives are ineffective against bioweapon facilities as they would simply aerosolize and disperse the deadly pathogens. The only viable military option is a preemptive nuclear strike, which can generate the heat and speed required to incinerate the agents completely, creating a terrifying strategic dilemma.