The idea that AI is required to create a catastrophic biological weapon is false. The Soviet Union's Biopreparat program successfully produced and stockpiled transmissible viruses like smallpox in large quantities for strategic use, demonstrating that this capability has existed for decades.

A malevolent actor using a published list of deadly viruses could release multiple pathogens at once from many locations. This would overwhelm medical systems and, most critically, cause societal collapse when essential frontline workers refuse to risk their lives and families for their jobs, shutting down the supply of food, power, and law enforcement.

During a civilization-collapsing event, the US government activates "Devolution," a classified continuity plan. A pre-selected group of officials with "go bags" are evacuated to secure, undisclosed facilities to ensure the government continues to function while the general populace is left to fend for itself.

The Soviet Union's goal with its bioweapons program was not just mass death but also psychological devastation. By engineering pathogens resistant to known cures like antibiotics, they aimed to shatter the American public's faith in its medical establishment, leading to societal collapse.

Unlike nuclear deterrence, there is no single theory of victory for biosecurity. The most effective approach is a layered strategy combining four pillars: Delay (e.g., data controls), Deter (e.g., treaties), Detect (e.g., wastewater monitoring), and Defend (e.g., far-UV sterilization).

Stockpiling multi-strain vaccines offers a strategic deterrent. While potentially less effective than a targeted vaccine, they can protect essential workers and military personnel, ensuring society continues to function during an attack. This resilience makes a biological attack a less attractive strategy for an adversary.

Before 9/11, the U.S. had only two BSL-4 labs for pathogens with no known cure. Following the 2001 anthrax attacks, the biodefense industry expanded dramatically, resulting in 15 BSL-4 labs and over a thousand BSL-3 labs, massively increasing the national risk of an accidental leak.

"Gain-of-function" research, intended to develop countermeasures for dangerous pathogens, uses the same methods as offensive bioweapon creation. This paradox means that efforts to defend against biological threats inherently increase the risk of creating them, whether deliberately or by accident.

In high-level war games, the Department of Defense's primary concern shifts quickly from the pathogen itself to the secondary effects of its release. The complete breakdown of civil order, mass anarchy, and armed insurrection are considered the more complex and dangerous long-term national security threats.