Private equity is increasingly buying and rolling up small, local businesses like dentists and landscapers, rather than acquiring and improving larger companies. Buchwald cautions that this shift means the asset class's future returns may differ significantly from the historical performance that investors have come to expect.

Related Insights

The private markets industry is bifurcating. General Partners (GPs) must either scale massively with broad distribution to sell multiple products, or focus on a highly differentiated, unique strategy. The middle ground—being a mid-sized, undifferentiated firm—is becoming the most difficult position to defend.

Capital has become commoditized with thousands of PE firms competing. The old model of buying low and selling high with minor tweaks no longer works. True value creation has shifted to hands-on operational improvements that drive long-term growth, a skill many investors lack.

Historically, private equity was pursued for its potential outperformance (alpha). Today, with shrinking public markets, its main value is providing diversification and access to a growing universe of private companies that are no longer available on public exchanges. This makes it a core portfolio completion tool.

When market competition compresses returns, PE firms that rigidly stick to historical IRR targets (e.g., 40%) are forced to underwrite increasingly risky deals. This strategy often backfires, as ignoring the elevated risk of failure leads to more blow-ups and poor fund performance.

Franchising has evolved beyond a mom-and-pop model into a sophisticated asset class. Private equity firms and former investment bankers are now actively acquiring and rolling up large franchise portfolios, signaling a shift towards treating them as major institutional investments.

Historically, investors demanded an "illiquidity premium" to compensate for the bug of being unable to sell. Now, firms market illiquidity as a feature that enforces discipline. In markets, you pay for features and get paid for bugs, implying this shift will lead to lower future returns for private assets.

Contrary to the narrative that PE firms create leaner, more efficient companies, the data reveals a starkly different reality. The debt-loading and cost-cutting tactics inherent in the PE model dramatically increase a portfolio company's risk of failure.

Investors are drawn to PE's smooth, bond-like volatility reporting. However, the underlying assets are small, highly indebted companies, which are inherently much riskier than public equities. This mismatch between perceived risk (low) and actual risk (high) creates a major portfolio allocation error.

The era of generating returns through leverage and multiple expansion is over. Future success in PE will come from driving revenue growth, entering at lower multiples, and adding operational expertise, particularly in the fragmented middle market where these opportunities are more prevalent.

Unlike venture capital, which relies on a few famous home runs, private equity success is built on a different model. It involves consistently executing "blocking and tackling" to achieve 3-4x returns on obscure industrial or service businesses that the public has never heard of.