Historically, investors demanded an "illiquidity premium" to compensate for the bug of being unable to sell. Now, firms market illiquidity as a feature that enforces discipline. In markets, you pay for features and get paid for bugs, implying this shift will lead to lower future returns for private assets.
A flood of capital into private credit has dramatically increased competition, causing the yield spread over public markets to shrink from 3-4% to less than 1%. This compression raises serious questions about whether investors are still being adequately compensated for illiquidity risk.
The market's liquidity crisis is driven by a fundamental disagreement. Limited Partners (LPs) suspect that long-held assets are overvalued, while General Partners (GPs) refuse to sell at a discount, fearing it will damage their track record (IRR/MOIC) and future fundraising ability. This creates a deadlock.
The rise of electronic and portfolio trading has made public credit markets as liquid as equity markets. This 'equitification' has compressed spreads by eliminating the historical illiquidity premium, forcing investors into private markets like private credit to find comparable yield.
PE firms are struggling to sell assets acquired in 2020-21, causing distributions to plummet from 30% to 10% annually. This cash crunch prevents investors from re-upping into new funds, shrinking the pool of capital and further depressing the PE-to-PE exit market, trapping investor money.
The private equity market has abundant capital and willing companies, yet transactions are stalled. This is because General Partners (GPs) fear selling at low returns and Limited Partners (LPs) fear over-commitment due to liquidity concerns, creating a gridlock where no one wants to act.
Private equity's reliance on terminal value for returns has created a liquidity crunch for LPs in the current high-rate environment. This has directly spurred demand for fund finance solutions—like NAV lending and GP structured transactions—to generate liquidity and support future fundraising.
While retail investors may demand daily pricing for private assets, this eliminates the "hidden benefit" of illiquidity that historically forced a long-term perspective. Constant valuation updates could encourage emotional, short-term trading, negating a core advantage of the asset class: staying the course.
Howard Marks highlights a critical issue in private equity: a massive overhang of portfolio companies needing to be sold to return capital. Higher interest rates have made exits difficult, creating a liquidity bottleneck that slows distributions to LPs and commitments to new funds.
The venture capital paradigm has inverted. Historically, private companies traded at an "illiquidity discount" to their public counterparts. Now, for elite companies, there is an "access premium" where investors pay more for private shares due to scarcity and hype. This makes staying private longer more attractive.
Despite widespread complaints about a lack of liquidity, LPs in an a16z fund unanimously rejected the opportunity to sell shares in top portfolio companies like Stripe. This reveals that LPs want to ride their winners and only seek exits for their less promising investments, creating a fundamental market mismatch.