In a typical LBO, the acquired company, not the PE firm, is responsible for the massive debt used to buy it. A proposed legislative fix would force PE firms to have "skin in the game" by sharing joint liability for these loans.

The podcast argues that the largest potential for destroying shareholder value comes from poorly executed acquisitions. Factors like management ego, buying at market peaks, and straying from core competencies make M&A a high-risk activity, often more damaging than operational challenges.

When market competition compresses returns, PE firms that rigidly stick to historical IRR targets (e.g., 40%) are forced to underwrite increasingly risky deals. This strategy often backfires, as ignoring the elevated risk of failure leads to more blow-ups and poor fund performance.

The typical 'buy and hold forever' strategy is riskier than perceived because the median lifespan of a public company is just a decade. This high corporate mortality rate, driven by M&A and failure, underscores the need for investors to regularly reassess holdings rather than assume longevity.

High-profile CEOs from large corporations frequently struggle as LBO operating partners. They are accustomed to vast resources and being the sole boss, a mentality that clashes with the mentorship and resource-constrained environment of smaller portfolio companies.

Investors are drawn to PE's smooth, bond-like volatility reporting. However, the underlying assets are small, highly indebted companies, which are inherently much riskier than public equities. This mismatch between perceived risk (low) and actual risk (high) creates a major portfolio allocation error.

Unlike venture capital, which invests in founders to create new products, private equity acquires existing companies to extract value through financial tactics. The goal is making money from money, not necessarily improving the core business.

To generate returns on a $10B acquisition, a PE firm needs a $25B exit, which often means an IPO. They must underwrite this IPO at a discount to public comps, despite having paid a 30% premium to acquire the company, creating a significant initial value gap to overcome from day one.

PE deals, especially without a large fund, cannot tolerate zeros. This necessitates a rigorous focus on risk reduction and what could go wrong. This is the opposite of angel investing, where the strategy is to accept many failures in a portfolio to capture the massive upside of the 1-in-10 winner.