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A key British intelligence failure before the Falklands War was assuming Argentina's junta would be constrained by factors like public opinion. This tendency to project democratic logic onto autocratic regimes was repeated with Putin's invasion of Ukraine, leading to surprise despite mounting evidence of intent.
An act of aggression can become so popular domestically that leaders feel compelled to see it through, even if initially intended as a negotiating tactic. The Argentine junta found the Falklands invasion was "the most popular thing they'd ever done," trapping them in a conflict they couldn't easily abandon.
Putin's history shows a reliable pattern: he appears cooperative and makes agreements, only to later act in his own self-interest. To predict his moves in conflicts like the Ukraine war, one must analyze this long-term behavioral pattern rather than his current statements or gestures.
To predict a leader's actions, disregard their words and even individual actions. Instead, focus on their consistent, long-term pattern of behavior. For Putin, the pattern is using negotiations as a stalling tactic to advance a fixed agenda, making him an unreliable partner for peace deals based on stated intentions.
The U.S. Embassy and CIA were unaware that the Shah was dying of leukemia, dismissing rumors as Russian propaganda. This critical intelligence gap meant they couldn't understand his indecisiveness and erratic behavior as the crisis escalated, misreading the entire situation.
Soviet leaders who lived through WWII understood the unpredictability of direct conflict and preferred proxy wars. Vladimir Putin, in contrast, has consistently used direct "hot wars"—from Chechnya to Georgia to Ukraine—as a primary tool to consolidate power and boost his domestic popularity.
Putin's desire to continue the war outweighs any potential benefits offered in negotiations. This persistence is not based on a reasonable assessment of the situation but on sunk costs, personal legacy, and a belief that Russia's sheer will can outlast Western support.
Contrary to their image of strength, authoritarian figures often rely on bluff and "anticipatory obedience." When confronted with direct, organized resistance, they frequently lack a follow-up plan and retreat, revealing their inherent fragility and dependence on their opposition's inaction.
Autocracies can achieve operational surprise, but democracies have a deeper strategic advantage: genuine, voluntary dedication. When attacked, citizens of democracies, from all walks of life, rush to defend their nation with an enthusiasm that cannot be commanded or coerced in an authoritarian state.
A dictator's attempts to consolidate power by purging potential rivals are counterproductive. This strategy creates a culture of fear where subordinates are too afraid to deliver bad news, isolating the leader from ground truth. This lack of accurate information increases the risk of catastrophic miscalculation and eventual downfall.
Unlike the cautious, collegial Soviet Politburo—composed of men who survived Stalin by avoiding opinions—Putin governs alone as a risk-taker. This lack of institutional checks and balances makes his actions dangerously unpredictable. The stability of Russia itself is fragile and dependent on him, making him a fundamentally different and more acute threat than his Cold War predecessors.