Instead of building a platform team of specialists, Eclipse operates like a small special forces unit. A lean team of senior partners, all ex-operators, handles everything from thesis creation to scaling companies. This ensures founders get direct support from proven builders, not junior staff.

A16Z's transformation from a small, generalist partnership to a large, specialized firm was a deliberate answer to a fundamental industry problem: the traditional partner model doesn't scale for deploying capital and making decisions in today's massive, professionalized venture market.

Effective private equity boards function as strategic advisory councils rather than governance bodies. Board members are expected to be co-investors who actively help with strategy, networking, and operational challenges like procurement, making them a key part of the value creation engine.

When fundraising, the most critical choice isn't the VC fund's brand but the specific partner who will join the board. Sophisticated founders vet the individual's strengths, weaknesses, and working style, as that person has a more direct impact on the company than the firm's logo on a term sheet.

Initially, a16z believed only former founder-CEOs could properly advise entrepreneurs. They later realized this was flawed. Many successful founders can't articulate how they succeeded and may not be interested in the investing skillset. The firm adjusted, realizing it's better to centralize operational advice (e.g., in books and specialist partners) rather than requiring it from every GP.

Large, contrarian investments feel like career risk to partners in a traditional VC firm, leading to bureaucracy and diluted conviction. Founder-led firms with small, centralized decision-making teams can operate with more decisiveness, enabling them to make the bold, potentially firm-defining bets that consensus-driven partnerships would avoid.

VC firms with shared partner control struggle to scale. Growth necessitates periodic reorganizations, which inevitably redistribute power. When partners vote on these changes, they optimize for their local interests, making it impossible to pass the necessary structural updates. This democratic model inherently prevents scaling.

By intentionally limiting its team size to around 230 people, the firm ensures senior partners can provide deep mentorship to the next generation. This structure prevents the team from becoming internally focused and keeps them hunting for deals, which are "not in the office."

The transition from a C-suite operator managing thousands to an investor is jarring. New VCs must adapt from leading large teams to being individual contributors who write their own memos and do their own sourcing. This "scaling down" ability, not just prior success, predicts their success as an investor.