The current AI spending spree by tech giants is historically reminiscent of the railroad and fiber-optic bubbles. These eras saw massive, redundant capital investment based on technological promise, which ultimately led to a crash when it became clear customers weren't willing to pay for the resulting products.

Unlike prior tech revolutions funded mainly by equity, the AI infrastructure build-out is increasingly reliant on debt. This blurs the line between speculative growth capital (equity) and financing for predictable cash flows (debt), magnifying potential losses and increasing systemic failure risk if the AI boom falters.

The current AI boom isn't just another tech bubble; it's a "bubble with bigger variance." The potential for massive upswings is matched by the risk of equally significant downswings. Investors and founders must have an unusually high tolerance for risk and volatility to succeed.

For the first time in years, leading-edge tech is incredibly expensive. This requires structured finance and massive capital, bringing Wall Street back to the table after being sidelined by cash-rich tech giants. The chaos and expense of AI create a new, lucrative playground for financiers.

Vincap International's CIO argues the AI market isn't a classic bubble. Unlike previous tech cycles, the installation phase (building infrastructure) is happening concurrently with the deployment phase (mass user adoption). This unique paradigm shift is driving real revenue and growth that supports high valuations.

Contrary to the idea that technology always gets cheaper, building on AI is less expensive now. The current phase is characterized by abundant venture capital and intense competition among AI tool providers, which subsidizes costs for developers. As the market consolidates, these costs will rise.

This AI cycle is distinct from the dot-com bubble because its leaders generate massive free cash flow, buy back stock, and pay dividends. This financial strength contrasts sharply with the pre-revenue, unprofitable companies that fueled the 1999 market, suggesting a more stable, if exuberant, foundation.

SoftBank selling its NVIDIA stake to fund OpenAI's data centers shows that the cost of AI infrastructure exceeds any single funding source. To pay for it, companies are creating a "Barbenheimer" mix of financing: selling public stock, raising private venture capital, securing government backing, and issuing long-term corporate debt.

Historical technology cycles suggest that the AI sector will almost certainly face a 'trough of disillusionment.' This occurs when massive capital expenditure fails to produce satisfactory short-term returns or adoption rates, leading to a market correction. The expert would be 'shocked' if this cycle avoided it.