Y Combinator's model pushes companies to raise at high valuations, often bypassing traditional seed rounds. Simultaneously, mega-funds cherry-pick the most proven founders at prices seed funds cannot compete with. This leaves traditional seed funds fighting for a narrowing and less attractive middle ground.

Related Insights

Unlike past platform shifts that caught many off-guard, the AI wave is universally anticipated. This 'consensus innovation' intensifies all existing competitive pressures, as every investor—from mega-funds to accelerators—is aggressively pursuing the same perceived opportunities, pushing factors like Power Law belief to an extreme.

A massive valuation for a "seed" round can be misleading. Often, insiders have participated in several unannounced, cheaper tranches. The headline number is just the final, most expensive tier, used to create FOMO and set a high watermark for new investors.

Mega-funds can justify paying "stupid prices" at the seed stage because they aren't underwriting a seed-stage return. Instead, they are buying an option on the next, much larger round where they'll deploy real capital. This allows them to outbid smaller funds who need to generate returns from the initial investment itself.

The current fundraising environment is the most binary in recent memory. Startups with the "right" narrative—AI-native, elite incubator pedigree, explosive growth—get funded easily. Companies with solid but non-hype metrics, like classic SaaS growers, are finding it nearly impossible to raise capital. The middle market has vanished.

Seed-focused funds have a powerful, non-obvious advantage over multi-stage giants: incentive alignment. A seed fund's goal is to maximize the next round's valuation for the founder. A multi-stage firm, hoping to lead the next round themselves, is implicitly motivated to keep that valuation lower, creating a conflict of interest.

The seed investing landscape isn't just expanding; it's actively replacing its previous generation. Legacy boutique seed firms are being squeezed by large multistage funds and new emerging managers, implying a VC's relevance has a 10-15 year cycle before a new cohort takes over.

Valuations don't jump dramatically; they 'sneak up on you.' An investor might balk at a $45M cap when they expected $40M. But the fear of missing a potential unicorn is stronger than the desire for a slightly better price, causing a gradual, batch-over-batch inflation of valuation norms.

The standard VC heuristic—that each investment must potentially return the entire fund—is strained by hyper-valuations. For a company raising at ~$200M, a typical fund needs a 60x return, meaning a $12 billion exit is the minimum for the investment to be a success, not a grand slam.

Seed funds that primarily act as a supply chain for Series A investors—optimizing for quick markups rather than fundamental value—are failing. This 'factory model' pushes them into the hyper-competitive 'white hot center' of the market, where deals are priced to perfection and outlier returns are rare.

Seed funds can win deals against multistage giants by highlighting the inherent conflict of interest. A seed-only investor is fully aligned with the founder to maximize the Series A valuation, whereas a multistage investor may want a lower price for their own follow-on investment.