A massive valuation for a "seed" round can be misleading. Often, insiders have participated in several unannounced, cheaper tranches. The headline number is just the final, most expensive tier, used to create FOMO and set a high watermark for new investors.

Mega-funds can justify paying "stupid prices" at the seed stage because they aren't underwriting a seed-stage return. Instead, they are buying an option on the next, much larger round where they'll deploy real capital. This allows them to outbid smaller funds who need to generate returns from the initial investment itself.

Y Combinator's model pushes companies to raise at high valuations, often bypassing traditional seed rounds. Simultaneously, mega-funds cherry-pick the most proven founders at prices seed funds cannot compete with. This leaves traditional seed funds fighting for a narrowing and less attractive middle ground.

Valuations don't jump dramatically; they 'sneak up on you.' An investor might balk at a $45M cap when they expected $40M. But the fear of missing a potential unicorn is stronger than the desire for a slightly better price, causing a gradual, batch-over-batch inflation of valuation norms.

Investors like Stacy Brown-Philpot and Aileen Lee now expect founders to demonstrate a clear, rapid path to massive scale early on. The old assumption that the next funding round would solve for scalability is gone; proof is required upfront.

The standard VC heuristic—that each investment must potentially return the entire fund—is strained by hyper-valuations. For a company raising at ~$200M, a typical fund needs a 60x return, meaning a $12 billion exit is the minimum for the investment to be a success, not a grand slam.

With Seed-to-A conversion below 20%, VCs are intensely vetting revenue quality. They are wary of "vibe ARR" inflated by pilots, credits, or non-recurring fees. Founders must demonstrate true, sticky recurring revenue with high customer loyalty and switching costs to secure a Series A.

Seed funds that primarily act as a supply chain for Series A investors—optimizing for quick markups rather than fundamental value—are failing. This 'factory model' pushes them into the hyper-competitive 'white hot center' of the market, where deals are priced to perfection and outlier returns are rare.

Elite seed funds investing in YC companies with millions in ARR are effectively pre-Series A investors. Their portfolio companies can become profitable and scale significantly on seed capital alone ("seed strapping"), making the traditional "Series A graduation rate" an outdated measure of a seed fund's success.