A massive valuation for a "seed" round can be misleading. Often, insiders have participated in several unannounced, cheaper tranches. The headline number is just the final, most expensive tier, used to create FOMO and set a high watermark for new investors.

Navan's post-IPO stock drop, despite strong revenue, is a troubling sign for the venture ecosystem. It highlights that even a multi-billion-dollar outcome can be considered a 'bummer' and may not generate sufficient returns for large, late-stage funds, resetting expectations for what constitutes a truly successful exit in the current market.

Mega-funds can justify paying "stupid prices" at the seed stage because they aren't underwriting a seed-stage return. Instead, they are buying an option on the next, much larger round where they'll deploy real capital. This allows them to outbid smaller funds who need to generate returns from the initial investment itself.

Top growth investors deliberately allocate more of their diligence effort to understanding and underwriting massive upside scenarios (10x+ returns) rather than concentrating on mitigating potential downside. The power-law nature of venture returns makes this a rational focus for generating exceptional performance.

Valuations don't jump dramatically; they 'sneak up on you.' An investor might balk at a $45M cap when they expected $40M. But the fear of missing a potential unicorn is stronger than the desire for a slightly better price, causing a gradual, batch-over-batch inflation of valuation norms.

When a company like Synthesia gets a $3B offer, founder and VC incentives decouple. For a founder with 10% equity, the lifestyle difference between a $300M exit and a potential $1B future exit is minimal. For a VC, that same 3.3x growth can mean the difference between a decent and a great fund return, making them far more willing to gamble.

The venture capital return model has shifted so dramatically that even some multi-billion-dollar exits are insufficient. This forces VCs to screen for 'immortal' founders capable of building $10B+ companies from inception, making traditionally solid businesses run by 'mortal founders' increasingly uninvestable by top funds.

This provides a simple but powerful framework for venture investing. For companies in markets with demonstrably huge TAMs (e.g., AI coding), valuation is secondary to backing the winner. For markets with a more uncertain or constrained TAM (e.g., vertical SaaS), traditional valuation discipline and entry price matter significantly.

The majority of venture capital funds fail to return capital, with a 60% loss-making base rate. This highlights that VC is a power-law-driven asset class. The key to success is not picking consistently good funds, but ensuring access to the tiny fraction of funds that generate extraordinary, outlier returns.