Europe's defense spending surge is a funding opportunity beyond just armaments. Private capital can finance critical infrastructure like barracks, logistics hubs, and hardened data centers, partnering with governments that lack entities like the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
Major European allies like the UK and France face a "lethal problem" where raising defense spending to meet US-led targets could trigger a bond market revolt. This fiscal constraint, coupled with voter opposition to tax hikes, makes meeting these commitments politically and economically untenable.
The unified fear of Russia is compelling Europe to pivot its economic focus towards industrial and defense manufacturing. This is a significant strategic shift for a region recently more focused on regulation and legacy industries, potentially revitalizing its industrial base.
Increased defense spending is not just a security measure. It presents a prime opportunity to create a European safe asset, funded at both national and EU levels, which is key to developing the deep, liquid capital market Europe currently lacks.
The US corporate market is 75% financed by capital markets, while Europe's is ~80% bank-financed. This structural inversion means Europe is undergoing a long-term, multi-decade shift toward institutional lending, creating a sustained tailwind for private credit growth that is far from mature.
German defense firm Rheinmetall's market cap surged from $5B to $80B post-Ukraine invasion, mirroring the explosive growth of AI companies. This highlights how major geopolitical shifts can act as powerful, unexpected catalysts for traditional industries, creating immense value for well-positioned incumbents.
Unlike the asset-light software era dominated by venture equity, the current AI and defense tech cycle is asset-heavy, requiring massive capital for hardware and infrastructure. This fundamental shift makes private credit a necessary financing tool for growth companies, forcing a mental model change away from Silicon Valley's traditional debt aversion.
A major segment of private credit isn't for LBOs, but large-scale financing for investment-grade companies against hard assets like data centers, pipelines, and aircraft. These customized, multi-billion dollar deals are often too complex or bespoke for public bond markets, creating a niche for direct lenders.
Private capital is more efficient for defense R&D than government grants, which involve burdensome oversight. Startups thrive when the government commits to buying finished products rather than funding prototypes, allowing VCs to manage the risk and de-burdening small companies.
Traditional defense primes are coupled to customer requirements and won't self-fund speculative projects. "Neo primes" like Epirus operate like product companies, investing their own capital to address military capability gaps, proving out new technologies, and then selling the finished solution.
Large European banks are not absent from lending, but they prefer the simplicity and regulatory ease of large, portfolio-level financing over complex, single-company underwriting. This strategic focus leaves a significant funding gap in the €100-€400M facility size range for private credit funds to fill.