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Top British ministers justified their non-intervention policy in Northern Ireland by admitting they knew "nothing at all" about the situation. This wasn't just an oversight but a political stance to avoid entanglement. This willful ignorance allowed the crisis to escalate uncontrollably, ultimately forcing a far more painful and protracted military intervention later on.

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Willful Ignorance Can Be a Deliberate but Disastrous Foreign Policy Stance | RiffOn