A multi-billion dollar exit's impact is relative to fund construction. For a concentrated Series A fund (30 companies), a $20B exit is a "Grand Slam." For a diversified seed fund (300 companies), the same exit is just a "Home Run" because it needs a 200x return, not a 30x, to be a true "fund returner."
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Unlike tech investing, where a single power-law outlier can return the entire fund, biotech wins are smaller in magnitude. This dynamic forces biotech VCs to prioritize a higher success rate across their portfolio rather than solely hunting for one massive unicorn.
Large, multi-stage funds can pay any price for seed rounds because the check size is immaterial to their fund's success. They view seed investments not on their own return potential, but as an option to secure pro-rata rights in future, massive growth rounds.
Sequoia Capital's Roloff Botha calculates that with ~$250 billion invested into venture capital annually, the industry needs to generate nearly $1 trillion in returns for investors. This translates to a staggering $1.5 trillion in total company exit value every year, a figure that is difficult to imagine materializing consistently.
A successful seed fund model is to first build a diversified 'farm team' of 20-25 companies with meaningful initial ownership. Then, after identifying the breakout performers, concentrate heavily by deploying up to 75% of the fund's capital into just 3-5 of them.
The standard VC heuristic—that each investment must potentially return the entire fund—is strained by hyper-valuations. For a company raising at ~$200M, a typical fund needs a 60x return, meaning a $12 billion exit is the minimum for the investment to be a success, not a grand slam.
Botha argues venture capital isn't a scalable asset class. Despite massive capital inflows (~$250B/year), the number of significant ($1B+) exits hasn't increased from ~20 per year. The math for industry-wide returns doesn't work, making it a "return-free risk" for many LPs.
The venture capital return model has shifted so dramatically that even some multi-billion-dollar exits are insufficient. This forces VCs to screen for 'immortal' founders capable of building $10B+ companies from inception, making traditionally solid businesses run by 'mortal founders' increasingly uninvestable by top funds.
Elite seed funds investing in YC companies with millions in ARR are effectively pre-Series A investors. Their portfolio companies can become profitable and scale significantly on seed capital alone ("seed strapping"), making the traditional "Series A graduation rate" an outdated measure of a seed fund's success.
David George of Andreessen Horowitz reveals that contrary to the belief that smaller funds yield higher multiples, a16z's best-performing fund is a $1B vehicle. This success is driven by capturing enough ownership in massive winners like Databricks and Coinbase, demonstrating that fund size can be an advantage in today's market where value creation extends into later private stages.
Mega-funds like a16z operate on a different model than smaller VCs. They provide Limited Partners with diversified, almost guaranteed access to every major tech company, prioritizing strong absolute dollar returns over the high multiples sought from smaller, more concentrated funds.
