A massive valuation for a "seed" round can be misleading. Often, insiders have participated in several unannounced, cheaper tranches. The headline number is just the final, most expensive tier, used to create FOMO and set a high watermark for new investors.

Mega-funds can justify paying "stupid prices" at the seed stage because they aren't underwriting a seed-stage return. Instead, they are buying an option on the next, much larger round where they'll deploy real capital. This allows them to outbid smaller funds who need to generate returns from the initial investment itself.

Y Combinator's model pushes companies to raise at high valuations, often bypassing traditional seed rounds. Simultaneously, mega-funds cherry-pick the most proven founders at prices seed funds cannot compete with. This leaves traditional seed funds fighting for a narrowing and less attractive middle ground.

Seed-focused funds have a powerful, non-obvious advantage over multi-stage giants: incentive alignment. A seed fund's goal is to maximize the next round's valuation for the founder. A multi-stage firm, hoping to lead the next round themselves, is implicitly motivated to keep that valuation lower, creating a conflict of interest.

Venture rounds are compressing and conflating, with massive "seed" rounds of $30M+ essentially combining a seed and Series A. This sets a dangerous trap: the expectations for your next funding round will be equivalent to those of a traditional Series B company, dramatically raising the bar for growth.

The standard VC heuristic—that each investment must potentially return the entire fund—is strained by hyper-valuations. For a company raising at ~$200M, a typical fund needs a 60x return, meaning a $12 billion exit is the minimum for the investment to be a success, not a grand slam.

Seed funds that primarily act as a supply chain for Series A investors—optimizing for quick markups rather than fundamental value—are failing. This 'factory model' pushes them into the hyper-competitive 'white hot center' of the market, where deals are priced to perfection and outlier returns are rare.

Elite seed funds investing in YC companies with millions in ARR are effectively pre-Series A investors. Their portfolio companies can become profitable and scale significantly on seed capital alone ("seed strapping"), making the traditional "Series A graduation rate" an outdated measure of a seed fund's success.

True alpha in venture capital is found at the extremes. It's either in being a "market maker" at the earliest stages by shaping a raw idea, or by writing massive, late-stage checks where few can compete. The competitive, crowded middle-stages offer less opportunity for outsized returns.