Mega-funds like a16z operate on a different model than smaller VCs. They provide Limited Partners with diversified, almost guaranteed access to every major tech company, prioritizing strong absolute dollar returns over the high multiples sought from smaller, more concentrated funds.
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Mega-funds can justify paying "stupid prices" at the seed stage because they aren't underwriting a seed-stage return. Instead, they are buying an option on the next, much larger round where they'll deploy real capital. This allows them to outbid smaller funds who need to generate returns from the initial investment itself.
Top growth investors deliberately allocate more of their diligence effort to understanding and underwriting massive upside scenarios (10x+ returns) rather than concentrating on mitigating potential downside. The power-law nature of venture returns makes this a rational focus for generating exceptional performance.
A core part of a16z's growth fund strategy is to invest in companies the firm's early-stage team passed on. This acts as an internal "fix the mistake fund," providing a structured way to correct errors of omission and get a second chance at breakout companies.
Large, multi-stage funds can pay any price for seed rounds because the check size is immaterial to their fund's success. They view seed investments not on their own return potential, but as an option to secure pro-rata rights in future, massive growth rounds.
Top-tier VC firms like Andreessen Horowitz are evolving beyond traditional venture investing. They are mirroring the playbook of private equity giants like Blackstone by acquiring other asset managers, expanding into new verticals like wealth management, and preparing to go public, prioritizing AUM growth.
Acknowledging venture capital's power-law returns makes winner-picking nearly impossible. Vested's quantitative model doesn't try. Instead, it identifies the top quintile of all startups to create a high-potential "pond." The strategy is then to achieve broad diversification within this pre-qualified group, ensuring they capture the eventual outliers.
Contrary to the belief that smaller VC funds generate higher multiples, a16z's data shows their larger funds can outperform. This is driven by the massive expansion of private markets, where significant value is now created in later growth stages (Series C and beyond).
The firm targets markets structured like the famous movie scene: first place wins big, second gets little, and third fails. They believe most tech markets, even B2B SaaS without network effects, concentrate value in the #1 player, making leadership essential for outsized returns.
David George of Andreessen Horowitz reveals that contrary to the belief that smaller funds yield higher multiples, a16z's best-performing fund is a $1B vehicle. This success is driven by capturing enough ownership in massive winners like Databricks and Coinbase, demonstrating that fund size can be an advantage in today's market where value creation extends into later private stages.
AI startups' explosive growth ($1M to $100M ARR in 2 years) will make venture's power law even more extreme. LPs may need a new evaluation model, underwriting VCs across "bundles of three funds" where they expect two modest performers (e.g., 1.5x) and one massive outlier (10x) to drive overall returns.
