When a clunky sales process fails, founders often incorrectly conclude their product isn't good enough and retreat to building more features. The real problem is typically the sales motion itself, which isn't aligned with customer demand. This leads to a cycle of building instead of fixing the sales process.
Any element in a sales process, from pitch to demo, that doesn't directly align with the customer's pre-existing demand creates "drag," slowing or killing the deal. The solution is not to push harder on the prospect but to re-engineer the sales motion to remove this friction by aligning with their goals.
Most founders instinctively try to "push" sales forward: creating urgency, sending non-stop follow-ups, and trying to convince prospects. The actual physics of sales is "pull." When a customer has genuine demand and lacks good options, they will do the work—scheduling meetings, bringing in stakeholders, and asking for information—to acquire your solution.
Many founders mistakenly believe achieving product-market fit is the final step to explosive growth. However, growth only ignites after also finding a repeatable go-to-market fit, which translates the founder's initial sales success into a scalable process that a sales team can execute consistently.
When you feel like you're trying to convince or 'push' a prospect during a sales call, treat it as a critical signal. This feeling indicates a flaw in your process—either you're targeting the wrong people or misinterpreting their demand. Use this to diagnose and fix the root cause.
Believing you must *convince* the market leads to a dangerous product strategy: building a feature-rich platform to persuade buyers. This delays sales, burns capital, and prevents learning. A "buyer pull" approach focuses on building the minimum product needed to solve one pre-existing problem.
When sales stall, founders assume the market isn't interested. More often, it's an execution problem: they fail to listen to clear demand signals or pitch irrelevant features, creating a self-inflicted "demand problem."
Founders instinctively obsess over the product as if it's the primary constraint. In the "case study factory" model, the product is not a stage itself, but a tool that enables sales and delivery. The true bottleneck is almost always in pipeline, sales, or delivery—not the product.
Founders often believe their product is flawed when facing rejection. However, if they're only speaking to 1-2 potential customers a week, the core issue isn't product-market fit. The real problem is an insufficient number of conversations to validate or disprove any hypothesis. You haven't earned the right to have a PMF crisis yet.
Founders often dread sales because they mistakenly believe their role is to aggressively convince customers. This "seller push" feels inauthentic. Adopting a "buyer pull" perspective, where you help customers solve existing problems, transforms sales from a chore into a collaborative process.
Founders often default to building product not for strategic reasons, but because it is a more comfortable activity than selling. Early-stage selling, without a finished product to lean on, creates significant discomfort. This aversion to uncomfortable situations is a primary driver of the value-destroying 'build it and they will come' mindset.