Dallas Fed's Lori Logan has signaled a potential shift away from targeting the Fed funds rate. As the Fed funds market has become inactive and is no longer a true market, targeting a traded repo rate would provide better real-time feedback on liquidity and policy implementation.
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Official liquidity measures like Fed balance sheet levels are too slow to be tradable. A better approach is to monitor the symptoms of liquidity conditions in real-time market data. Indicators like SOFR spreads, commercial paper spreads, and unusual yield curve shapes reveal the health of private credit creation.
The recent uptick in the Fed funds rate was not a direct signal of scarce bank reserves. Instead, it was driven by its primary lenders, Federal Home Loan Banks, shifting their cash to the higher-yielding repo market. This supply-side shift forced borrowers in the Fed funds market to pay more.
The Fed's SRF is proving ineffective at capping repo rates. Despite rates trading well above the facility's level, usage was minimal. This indicates a market stigma or hesitation, questioning its ability to function as a reliable backstop for temporary liquidity shortages and control rates.
The Fed has a clear hierarchy for managing liquidity post-QT. It will first adjust administered rates like the Standing Repo Facility (SRF) rate and use temporary open market operations (TOMOs) for short-term needs. Direct T-bill purchases are a more distant tool, reserved for 2026, as the system is not yet at 'reserve scarcity'.
The impending halt of the Fed's balance sheet reduction (QT) is not a reaction to a major economic crisis, but a technical necessity to prevent stress in short-term funding markets as bank reserves become scarce. The Fed is preemptively avoiding a 2019-style repo spike, signaling a quiet return to mild balance sheet expansion.
Recent spikes in repo rates show funding markets are now highly sensitive to new collateral. The dwindling overnight Reverse Repo (RRP) facility, once a key buffer, is no longer absorbing shocks, indicating liquidity has tightened significantly and Quantitative Tightening (QT) has reached its practical limit.
The Fed's "ample reserve" system has fundamentally changed the Fed funds market. Banks no longer need to borrow reserves from each other. The market is now dominated by non-U.S. banks borrowing from home loan banks in a simple arbitrage trade, making it a poor barometer of liquidity.
The Fed funds market is a flawed policy benchmark because it's small, concentrated, and dominated by foreign banks borrowing for arbitrage rather than genuine liquidity needs. This makes it a poor indicator of true funding conditions across the broader financial system.
If the Fed adopts a repo rate like TGCR as its policy benchmark, its Standing Repo Facility (SRF) must evolve. It would shift from being a passive emergency backstop to an active tool for daily rate management, similar to how the Fed's RRP and IORB rates currently operate.
The Fed’s Standing Repo Facility (SRF) has been only partially effective at capping overnight funding rates. Its efficacy could be improved through structural changes like making it centrally cleared, offering it continuously for on-demand liquidity, or lowering its rate to separate it from the discount window.