The Fed funds market is a flawed policy benchmark because it's small, concentrated, and dominated by foreign banks borrowing for arbitrage rather than genuine liquidity needs. This makes it a poor indicator of true funding conditions across the broader financial system.
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The recent uptick in the Fed funds rate was not a direct signal of scarce bank reserves. Instead, it was driven by its primary lenders, Federal Home Loan Banks, shifting their cash to the higher-yielding repo market. This supply-side shift forced borrowers in the Fed funds market to pay more.
The Fed's SRF is proving ineffective at capping repo rates. Despite rates trading well above the facility's level, usage was minimal. This indicates a market stigma or hesitation, questioning its ability to function as a reliable backstop for temporary liquidity shortages and control rates.
The Fed has a clear hierarchy for managing liquidity post-QT. It will first adjust administered rates like the Standing Repo Facility (SRF) rate and use temporary open market operations (TOMOs) for short-term needs. Direct T-bill purchases are a more distant tool, reserved for 2026, as the system is not yet at 'reserve scarcity'.
The act of a small committee deciding the "correct" cost of money is analogous to communist planners setting prices for consumer goods. This approach assumes an impossible level of knowledge and control over a complex economy, a model that has consistently failed throughout history.
A recent global fixed income sell-off was not triggered by a single U.S. event but by a cascade of disparate actions from central banks and data releases in smaller economies like Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. This decentralized shift is an unusual dynamic for markets, leading to dollar weakness.
According to BlackRock's CIO Rick Reeder, the critical metric for the economy isn't the Fed Funds Rate, but a stable 10-year Treasury yield. This stability lowers volatility in the mortgage market, which is far more impactful for real-world borrowing, corporate funding, and international investor confidence.
Recent spikes in repo rates show funding markets are now highly sensitive to new collateral. The dwindling overnight Reverse Repo (RRP) facility, once a key buffer, is no longer absorbing shocks, indicating liquidity has tightened significantly and Quantitative Tightening (QT) has reached its practical limit.
The early end to the Fed's Quantitative Tightening (QT) is largely irrelevant for year-end funding pressures. The monthly $20 billion runoff is insignificant compared to daily swings in Treasury balances or money market funds. The primary drivers remain bank balance sheet constraints and regulatory hurdles.
If the Fed adopts a repo rate like TGCR as its policy benchmark, its Standing Repo Facility (SRF) must evolve. It would shift from being a passive emergency backstop to an active tool for daily rate management, similar to how the Fed's RRP and IORB rates currently operate.
The Fed’s Standing Repo Facility (SRF) has been only partially effective at capping overnight funding rates. Its efficacy could be improved through structural changes like making it centrally cleared, offering it continuously for on-demand liquidity, or lowering its rate to separate it from the discount window.