The Fed's SRF is proving ineffective at capping repo rates. Despite rates trading well above the facility's level, usage was minimal. This indicates a market stigma or hesitation, questioning its ability to function as a reliable backstop for temporary liquidity shortages and control rates.

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After a decade of zero rates and QE post-2008, the financial system can no longer function without continuous stimulus. Attempts to tighten policy, as seen with the 2018 repo crisis, immediately cause breakdowns, forcing central banks to reverse course and indicating a permanent state of intervention.

Contrary to fears of a spike, a major rise in 10-year Treasury yields is unlikely. The current wide gap between long-term yields and the Fed's lower policy rate—a multi-year anomaly—makes these bonds increasingly attractive to buyers. This dynamic creates a natural ceiling on how high long-term rates can go.

The Fed has a clear hierarchy for managing liquidity post-QT. It will first adjust administered rates like the Standing Repo Facility (SRF) rate and use temporary open market operations (TOMOs) for short-term needs. Direct T-bill purchases are a more distant tool, reserved for 2026, as the system is not yet at 'reserve scarcity'.

Due to massive government debt, the Fed's tools work paradoxically. Raising rates increases the deficit via higher interest payments, which is stimulative. Cutting rates is also inherently stimulative. The Fed is no longer controlling inflation but merely choosing the path through which it occurs.

Recent spikes in repo rates show funding markets are now highly sensitive to new collateral. The dwindling overnight Reverse Repo (RRP) facility, once a key buffer, is no longer absorbing shocks, indicating liquidity has tightened significantly and Quantitative Tightening (QT) has reached its practical limit.

When government spending is massive ("fiscal dominance"), the Federal Reserve's ability to manage the economy via interest rates is neutralized. The government's deficit spending is so large that it dictates economic conditions, rendering rate cuts ineffective at solving structural problems.

The early end to the Fed's Quantitative Tightening (QT) is largely irrelevant for year-end funding pressures. The monthly $20 billion runoff is insignificant compared to daily swings in Treasury balances or money market funds. The primary drivers remain bank balance sheet constraints and regulatory hurdles.

The recent widening of long-end swap spreads was driven by expectations for a benchmark rate change and an earlier end to QT. The FOMC meeting disappointed on both fronts, causing spreads to narrow as the specific catalysts priced by the market failed to materialize. This highlights how granular policy expectations drive specific market instruments.

The Federal Reserve’s decision to end Quantitative Tightening (QT) is heavily influenced by a desire to avoid a repeat of the 2019 funding crisis. The 'political economy' of the decision is key, as the Fed aims to prevent giving critics 'ammunition' by demonstrating it can control short-term rates.

The Fed’s Standing Repo Facility (SRF) has been only partially effective at capping overnight funding rates. Its efficacy could be improved through structural changes like making it centrally cleared, offering it continuously for on-demand liquidity, or lowering its rate to separate it from the discount window.