After a decade of zero rates and QE post-2008, the financial system can no longer function without continuous stimulus. Attempts to tighten policy, as seen with the 2018 repo crisis, immediately cause breakdowns, forcing central banks to reverse course and indicating a permanent state of intervention.

The Fed's SRF is proving ineffective at capping repo rates. Despite rates trading well above the facility's level, usage was minimal. This indicates a market stigma or hesitation, questioning its ability to function as a reliable backstop for temporary liquidity shortages and control rates.

The Fed has a clear hierarchy for managing liquidity post-QT. It will first adjust administered rates like the Standing Repo Facility (SRF) rate and use temporary open market operations (TOMOs) for short-term needs. Direct T-bill purchases are a more distant tool, reserved for 2026, as the system is not yet at 'reserve scarcity'.

J.P. Morgan believes the Fed's balance sheet runoff can continue until at least Q1 2026, and potentially longer. The financial system's ability to smoothly handle recent funding stress points (like corporate tax day) suggests that reserves are still abundant enough to support a prolonged QT timeline.

Unlike September 2019, the recent corporate tax day saw no funding crisis. The mere existence of the Fed's Standing Repo Facility (SRF) calmed markets, preventing panic. This psychological backstop, combined with higher bank reserves and a better regulatory environment, proved crucial for stability.

Recent spikes in repo rates show funding markets are now highly sensitive to new collateral. The dwindling overnight Reverse Repo (RRP) facility, once a key buffer, is no longer absorbing shocks, indicating liquidity has tightened significantly and Quantitative Tightening (QT) has reached its practical limit.

The early end to the Fed's Quantitative Tightening (QT) is largely irrelevant for year-end funding pressures. The monthly $20 billion runoff is insignificant compared to daily swings in Treasury balances or money market funds. The primary drivers remain bank balance sheet constraints and regulatory hurdles.

The Fed funds market is a flawed policy benchmark because it's small, concentrated, and dominated by foreign banks borrowing for arbitrage rather than genuine liquidity needs. This makes it a poor indicator of true funding conditions across the broader financial system.

If the Fed adopts a repo rate like TGCR as its policy benchmark, its Standing Repo Facility (SRF) must evolve. It would shift from being a passive emergency backstop to an active tool for daily rate management, similar to how the Fed's RRP and IORB rates currently operate.