Ben Horowitz states a common VC mistake is over-indexing on a startup's weaknesses. The better investment is a team that is unequivocally the best at a single, critical thing. Being "pretty good" at everything is a red flag, as greatness in one area is what drives extraordinary outcomes.
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Over-diligencing for well-rounded perfection is a mistake. The best companies rarely excel in every area initially. Instead, investors should identify the one "spike"—the single dimension where the company is 5-10x better than anyone else—as this is the true indicator of outlier potential, rather than looking for a company that is A+ across the board.
Undiversified founders can't afford a VC's portfolio mindset. Instead of pursuing ideas that *could* work, they must adopt strategies that would be *weird if they didn't work*. This shifts focus from optimizing for a chance of success to minimizing the chance of absolute failure.
a16z's investment philosophy is to assess founders on how world-class they are at their core strengths. Horowitz warns it's a mistake to pass on a uniquely talented founder due to fixable weaknesses (e.g., no go-to-market plan) and an equal mistake to back a less talented founder just because they lack obvious flaws.
VCs often pass on great deals by overweighting the fear of future competition from giants like Google. The better mental model is to invest in founders with demonstrable "strength of strengths," accepting that some weaknesses are okay, rather than seeking a flawless profile.
Resist the common trend of chasing popular deals. Instead, invest years in deeply understanding a specific, narrow sector. This specialized expertise allows you to make smarter investment decisions, add unique value to companies, and potentially secure better deal pricing when opportunities eventually arise.
VCs often pass on great companies by over-indexing on the theoretical threat of future competition from incumbents like Google. Andreessen Horowitz's post-mortems show this is a common mistake. The better approach is to invest in a founder's unique, "spiking strengths" rather than focusing on a lack of hypothetical future threats.
A truly exceptional founder is a talent magnet who will relentlessly iterate until they find a winning model. Rejecting a partnership based on a weak initial idea is a mistake; the founder's talent is the real asset. They will likely pivot to a much bigger opportunity.
Lonsdale recounts passing on brilliant founders with seemingly terrible ideas, only to watch them pivot and build billion-dollar companies like Cursor. The lesson for early-stage investors is to prioritize backing exceptional, world-class talent, even if their initial concept seems flawed, as they possess the ability to find a winning strategy.
Horowitz instructs his team to focus on how exceptionally good a founder is at their core competency. He warns against two common errors: passing on a world-class individual due to fixable weaknesses, and investing in a founder with no glaring flaws but no world-class strengths.
Venture capital should focus on what a founder does exceptionally well, rather than penalizing them for past failures or weaknesses. Ben Horowitz uses the Adam Neumann example to illustrate their principle: judge people by their spectacular talents (like building the WeWork brand) and help them manage their flaws, which is a more effective strategy than seeking perfectly flawless individuals.
