Cliff Asness coined the term "volatility laundering" to describe how private equity masks its true risk. The strategy is fundamentally levered equity, which is highly volatile. By not marking to market daily, firms smooth returns and report low volatility—an accounting fiction, not an economic reality.

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Private equity and venture capital funds create an illusion of stability by avoiding daily mark-to-market pricing. This "laundering of volatility" is a core reason companies stay private longer. It reveals a key, if artificial, benefit of private markets that new technologies like tokenization could disrupt.

Private equity's low reported correlation with public markets is largely an illusion created by smoothed, infrequent valuations ("volatility laundering"). The effect is exaggerated when institutions report private asset returns with a one-quarter lag, creating "accounting diversification" instead of real risk reduction.

Historically, investors demanded an "illiquidity premium" to compensate for the bug of being unable to sell. Now, firms market illiquidity as a feature that enforces discipline. In markets, you pay for features and get paid for bugs, implying this shift will lead to lower future returns for private assets.

Jeff Gundlach argues private credit's attractive Sharpe ratio is misleading. Assets aren't priced daily, hiding risk. When an asset is finally marked, it can go from a valuation of 100 to zero in weeks, exposing the “low volatility” as a dangerous fallacy.

While retail investors may demand daily pricing for private assets, this eliminates the "hidden benefit" of illiquidity that historically forced a long-term perspective. Constant valuation updates could encourage emotional, short-term trading, negating a core advantage of the asset class: staying the course.

Contrary to the narrative that PE firms create leaner, more efficient companies, the data reveals a starkly different reality. The debt-loading and cost-cutting tactics inherent in the PE model dramatically increase a portfolio company's risk of failure.

Howard Marks argues that private credit's apparent low volatility during market downturns is not magic but an accounting feature. By not marking to market daily, it mimics the psychological trick of simply not looking at your public portfolio's value, creating a potentially false sense of security for investors.

Investors are drawn to PE's smooth, bond-like volatility reporting. However, the underlying assets are small, highly indebted companies, which are inherently much riskier than public equities. This mismatch between perceived risk (low) and actual risk (high) creates a major portfolio allocation error.

PE deals, especially without a large fund, cannot tolerate zeros. This necessitates a rigorous focus on risk reduction and what could go wrong. This is the opposite of angel investing, where the strategy is to accept many failures in a portfolio to capture the massive upside of the 1-in-10 winner.

The primary risk in private markets isn't necessarily financial loss, but rather informational disadvantage ('opacity') and the inability to pivot quickly ('illiquidity'). In contrast, public markets' main risk is short-term price volatility that can impact performance metrics. This highlights that each market type requires a fundamentally different risk management approach.