Understanding Xi requires seeing him as a Mao-style figure who prioritizes ideological purity and absolute control, unlike the pragmatic, market-driven flexibility of Deng Xiaoping. This informs his aggressive domestic purges and makes him a more volatile negotiating partner.

By publicly stating a desire to avoid the historical pattern of a rising power (China) clashing with a declining one (US), Xi Jinping strategically framed the future of the relationship as an economic partnership rather than an inevitable military conflict.

While Xi looms large, his foreign policy is largely consistent with the path set by his predecessors. He has capitalized on China's increased power to pursue established goals more intensely, but he has not radically changed the overall direction. Focusing only on him as an individual misses this continuity.

The dynamic between a rising power (China) and a ruling one (the U.S.) fits the historical pattern of the "Thucydides' trap." In 12 of the last 16 instances of this scenario, the confrontation has ended in open war, suggesting that a peaceful resolution is the exception, not the rule.

The 1990s belief that economic liberalization would inevitably make China democratic provided ideological cover for policies that fueled its growth. This hubris, combined with corporate greed, allowed the US to facilitate the rise of its greatest geopolitical rival without achieving the expected political reforms.

The Western belief that free trade would cause authoritarian states like China to liberalize has proven false. Instead, this policy created a powerful manufacturing competitor whose interests diverge from the West's. The current era of deglobalization is an unwinding of this flawed foundational premise of the post-war order.

The era following Xi Jinping's rule could be more dangerous than his tenure itself. A successor, potentially from a military junta, might launch a conflict—mirroring Deng Xiaoping's 1979 Vietnam War—to assert their legitimacy and consolidate power over the party and the PLA, creating a highly volatile situation.

China is structurally incapable of displacing the U.S. due to a trio of critical weaknesses: Xi Jinping's consolidation of power has paralyzed decision-making, geography boxes in its military, and an irreversible demographic crisis signals imminent collapse.

China's inner circle, led by Xi Jinping, believes the U.S. is in terminal decline. They view American social and political paradoxes—like New York, the center of capitalism, electing a socialist—not as features of a complex democracy, but as evidence of a fracturing and decaying society.