When owned by multiple private equity firms with varying exit horizons, IFS mitigates conflicting priorities by ensuring acquisition targets, even strategic ones, have a robust business plan to achieve profitability within 18 months to two years.

While often seen as aligning interests, giving sellers equity in the parent acquirer can backfire. It dilutes their risk on their specific business unit's performance, as their compensation becomes tied to the entire company's success. This can reduce focus on hitting their own unit's targets.

When pursuing a distressed company, understand the investors' intrinsic motivations. They often prioritize avoiding a public failure and protecting their reputation with LPs over recouping sunk capital. Frame the deal as a success story for them, not a fire sale.

Unlike venture-backed startups that chase lightning in a bottle (often ending in zero), private equity offers a different path. Operators can buy established, cash-flowing businesses and apply their growth skills in a less risky environment with shorter time horizons and a higher probability of a positive financial outcome.

Contrary to the narrative that PE firms create leaner, more efficient companies, the data reveals a starkly different reality. The debt-loading and cost-cutting tactics inherent in the PE model dramatically increase a portfolio company's risk of failure.

Founders who wait until they need to sell have already failed. A successful exit requires a multi-year 'background process' of building relationships. The key is to engage with SVPs and business unit leaders at potential acquirers—the people who will champion the deal internally—not just the Corp Dev team who merely execute transactions.

To generate returns on a $10B acquisition, a PE firm needs a $25B exit, which often means an IPO. They must underwrite this IPO at a discount to public comps, despite having paid a 30% premium to acquire the company, creating a significant initial value gap to overcome from day one.

Venture capitalists often have portfolio companies that are profitable and growing but will never achieve the breakout public offering VCs need. These companies can become a distraction for the VC and can be acquired by PE investors who see them as attractive, stable assets.

Counterintuitively, making a business hyper-efficient before a sale is not always optimal. Roughly half of buyers prefer acquiring companies with identifiable inefficiencies because improving them is a key part of their own value-creation thesis and justification for the acquisition.