When evaluating a deal, sophisticated LPs look beyond diversifying customers and suppliers. They analyze the number of viable exit channels. A company whose only realistic exit path is an IPO faces significant hold period risk if public markets turn, making exit diversification a key resiliency metric.
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Limited Partners should resist pressuring VCs for early exits to lock in DPI. The best companies compound value at incredible rates, making it optimal to hold winners. Instead, LPs should manage portfolio duration and liquidity by building a balanced portfolio of early-stage, growth, and secondary fund investments.
Historically, private equity was pursued for its potential outperformance (alpha). Today, with shrinking public markets, its main value is providing diversification and access to a growing universe of private companies that are no longer available on public exchanges. This makes it a core portfolio completion tool.
The traditional IPO exit is being replaced by a perpetual secondary market for elite private companies. This new paradigm provides liquidity for investors and employees without the high costs and regulatory burdens of going public. This shift fundamentally alters the venture capital lifecycle, enabling longer private holding periods.
The default VC practice of distributing shares after an IPO lockup can leave massive gains on the table. Missing a multi-billion dollar run-up suggests a more nuanced, case-by-case discussion with LPs is needed, as holding can be the difference between a 5x and a 15x fund.
Success in late-stage venture resembles trading more than traditional investing—it's about buying and selling on momentum. However, this "new public market" has a critical flaw: while liquidity exists on the way up, it vanishes on the downside, making it impossible to execute a true trading strategy when a correction occurs.
The most lucrative exit for a startup is often not an IPO, but an M&A deal within an oligopolistic industry. When 3-4 major players exist, they can be forced into an irrational bidding war driven by the fear of a competitor acquiring the asset, leading to outcomes that are even better than going public.
Contrary to the popular VC idea that IPO pops are 'free money' left on the table, they actually serve as a crucial risk premium for public market investors. Down-rounds like Navan's prove that buyers need the upside from successful IPOs to compensate for the very real risk of losing money on others.
The increased volatility and shorter defensibility windows in the AI era challenge traditional VC portfolio construction. The logical response to this heightened risk is greater diversification. This implies that early-stage funds may need to be larger to support more investments or write smaller checks into more companies.
Instead of diversifying randomly, a more effective strategy is to expand into adjacent verticals. Leverage your existing, happy clients for introductions into these parallel industries. This approach uses your established credibility and relationships as a bridge to new markets, lowering the barrier to entry.
Unlike in tech where an IPO is often a liquidity event for early investors, a biotech IPO is an "entrance." It functions as a financing round to bring in public market capital needed for expensive late-stage trials. The true exit for investors is typically a future acquisition.
