The ubiquitous corporate "five-year plan" is not a benign business tool; its conceptual creator was Joseph Stalin for managing the Soviet Union. This framework is fundamentally ill-suited for a dynamic, capitalist environment, routinely failing because its iteration cycle is too slow. The persistence of this model represents a "hand coming out of the grave" of central planning.

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Some companies execute a 3-5 year plan and then revert to average returns. Others 'win by winning'—their success creates new opportunities and network effects, turning them into decade-long compounders that investors often sell too early.

Corporate creativity follows a bell curve. Early-stage companies and those facing catastrophic failure (the tails) are forced to innovate. Most established companies exist in the middle, where repeating proven playbooks and playing it safe stifles true risk-taking.

For years, Japan was a value trap: cheap companies with poor governance hoarded cash. The game changed when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe introduced stewardship and governance codes, creating a top-down, government-backed catalyst for companies to finally improve capital allocation and unlock shareholder value.

Economic pressure forces leaders to prioritize immediate, bold actions over incremental gains. This creates a stigma against continuous improvement, which can be perceived as slow or lacking strategic impact. The mandate is for massive, transformative change, not small, sustainable steps.

In Russia, nominally private companies like Gazprom function as direct extensions of the state. Their international investments are designed not just for profit but to achieve geopolitical goals, creating a system where foreign policy, business interests, and the personal wealth of the ruling class are completely inseparable.

Parkinson's Law suggests bureaucracy naturally grows 5-7% annually. To combat this, leaders can measure a "Bureaucracy Mass Index" by tracking wait times and useless activities. This metric turns the fight against bloat into a manageable, health-like goal.

Despite rhetoric about shifting to a consumption-led economy, China's rigid annual GDP growth targets make this impossible. This political necessity forces a constant return to state-driven fixed asset investment to hit the numbers. The result is a "cha-cha" of economic policy—one step toward rebalancing, two steps back toward the old model—making any true shift short-lived.

The dramatic drop in China's Fixed Asset Investment isn't a sign of economic failure. Instead, it reflects a deliberate government-led "anti-involution" campaign to strip out industrial overcapacity. This painful but planned adjustment aims to create a more streamlined, profitable economy, fundamentally reordering its growth model away from sheer volume.

The frustrating techniques common in modern customer service—creating needless complexity and slowing down processes—are nearly identical to the "simple sabotage" tactics promoted by the US government for citizens in Nazi-occupied Europe to disrupt enemy operations.

Large corporations can afford lobbyists and consultants to navigate geopolitical shifts, but their size makes strategic pivots notoriously difficult. This creates opportunities for agile startups and SMEs, which can adapt their strategies and organizations much faster to the changing landscape.