A 1994 reform shifted tax revenues to China's central government while leaving spending obligations at the local level. This created a structural deficit for municipalities, forcing them to rely on off-balance-sheet land lease auctions as their primary source of funding, which in turn fueled the property bubble.
The policy restricted developer borrowing to curb speculation but failed to address the core drivers: households' need for a savings vehicle and local governments' dependency on land sales for revenue. By attacking the intermediary, the policy caused a crisis without solving the fundamental problem.
The hukou system links social welfare benefits to one's hometown, not their place of work. Migrant workers in cities are thus excluded from local safety nets, compelling them to invest heavily in real estate as a private substitute for state-provided welfare, healthcare, and retirement security.
Statisticians now believe local Chinese governments have lied about demographics for over 25 years. The realization came from plummeting tax receipts, suggesting millions of children thought born in the late 90s never existed. The country's population may be overstated by 100-300 million people, accelerating its collapse.
Despite developing the world's cheapest solar power, China remains addicted to coal for political, not economic, reasons. Countless local governments in poorer regions depend entirely on coal mining for revenue and employment. This creates a powerful political inertia that the central government is unwilling or unable to overcome, prioritizing local stability and energy security over a complete green transition.
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, which ignited China’s growth, were based on adopting American free-market principles like private enterprise and foreign capital. China’s success stemmed from decentralizing its economy, the very system the U.S. is now tempted to abandon for a more centralized model.
In the late 1980s, facing a lack of capital, China began experimenting with Hong Kong's model of leasing state-owned land. This became the primary financing mechanism for local governments, especially after a 1994 tax reform limited their revenue, fueling decades of rapid urban development.
China's economic structure, which funnels state-backed capital into sectors like EVs, inherently creates overinvestment and excess capacity. This distorted cost of capital leads to hyper-competitive industries, making it difficult for even successful companies to generate predictable, growing returns for shareholders.
Despite rhetoric about shifting to a consumption-led economy, China's rigid annual GDP growth targets make this impossible. This political necessity forces a constant return to state-driven fixed asset investment to hit the numbers. The result is a "cha-cha" of economic policy—one step toward rebalancing, two steps back toward the old model—making any true shift short-lived.
Due to financial repression and a lack of viable investment alternatives, Chinese households rationally pour savings into property, often leaving them vacant. This creates an affordability crisis for those needing a home, alongside a massive inventory of empty apartments held as investments.
The immense profitability of real estate in China created a gravitational pull for capital and talent. Productive companies diverted resources to start real estate side-businesses, and entrepreneurs abandoned other sectors, resulting in a net drag on national productivity and innovation.