In the late 1980s, facing a lack of capital, China began experimenting with Hong Kong's model of leasing state-owned land. This became the primary financing mechanism for local governments, especially after a 1994 tax reform limited their revenue, fueling decades of rapid urban development.
A 1994 reform shifted tax revenues to China's central government while leaving spending obligations at the local level. This created a structural deficit for municipalities, forcing them to rely on off-balance-sheet land lease auctions as their primary source of funding, which in turn fueled the property bubble.
The policy restricted developer borrowing to curb speculation but failed to address the core drivers: households' need for a savings vehicle and local governments' dependency on land sales for revenue. By attacking the intermediary, the policy caused a crisis without solving the fundamental problem.
A massive foreign investment package is not just an economic transaction; it's a strategic tool. By embedding itself in a nation's economy through land and real estate, a foreign power buys political leverage and can subtly shape policy to its own advantage, corrupting the country from within.
China's economic ascent began when Deng Xiaoping invited American experts to teach them about capitalism. This strategy, combined with becoming the world's manufacturing hub, allowed them to learn the system, grow strong quietly, and eventually become a dominant global power.
The hukou system links social welfare benefits to one's hometown, not their place of work. Migrant workers in cities are thus excluded from local safety nets, compelling them to invest heavily in real estate as a private substitute for state-provided welfare, healthcare, and retirement security.
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, which ignited China’s growth, were based on adopting American free-market principles like private enterprise and foreign capital. China’s success stemmed from decentralizing its economy, the very system the U.S. is now tempted to abandon for a more centralized model.
Despite rhetoric about shifting to a consumption-led economy, China's rigid annual GDP growth targets make this impossible. This political necessity forces a constant return to state-driven fixed asset investment to hit the numbers. The result is a "cha-cha" of economic policy—one step toward rebalancing, two steps back toward the old model—making any true shift short-lived.
Due to financial repression and a lack of viable investment alternatives, Chinese households rationally pour savings into property, often leaving them vacant. This creates an affordability crisis for those needing a home, alongside a massive inventory of empty apartments held as investments.
The dramatic drop in China's Fixed Asset Investment isn't a sign of economic failure. Instead, it reflects a deliberate government-led "anti-involution" campaign to strip out industrial overcapacity. This painful but planned adjustment aims to create a more streamlined, profitable economy, fundamentally reordering its growth model away from sheer volume.
The immense profitability of real estate in China created a gravitational pull for capital and talent. Productive companies diverted resources to start real estate side-businesses, and entrepreneurs abandoned other sectors, resulting in a net drag on national productivity and innovation.