Independent research firm Rhodium Group argues China's official GDP data is unrealistically stable and overstates growth. By analyzing expenditure-side components, they estimate recent growth has averaged closer to 2-3%, reflecting the severe property sector collapse.

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While Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measures economic output via spending, Gross Domestic Income (GDI) measures it via income. The significant gap between the two in Q3 suggests the economy's underlying strength is weaker than the headline number indicates, as an average of the two is often more accurate.

Despite a property downturn subtracting nearly 1.5 percentage points from GDP, China's economy is buoyed by a hyper-competitive manufacturing sector. With cost advantages of 20-40% in key high-tech sectors, its export growth is outpacing global trade, creating a resilient but unbalanced economic picture.

China reports 5% real GDP growth while experiencing persistent deflation. This is historically unprecedented for an investment-led economy, with the only possible parallel being the 19th-century U.S. The inconsistency suggests official growth numbers are not credible.

China's economic success is driven by a small, hyper-competitive private sector (the top 5%). This masks a much larger, dysfunctional morass of state-owned enterprises, leading to declining overall capital productivity despite headline-grabbing advances.

The widely reported collapse of China's housing market is not an organic crisis but a state-directed reallocation of capital. By instructing banks to prioritize industrial capacity over mortgages, the government is deliberately shifting funds away from a speculative real estate bubble and into strategic sectors like microchips to counter US sanctions and build self-sufficiency.

Despite rhetoric about shifting to a consumption-led economy, China's rigid annual GDP growth targets make this impossible. This political necessity forces a constant return to state-driven fixed asset investment to hit the numbers. The result is a "cha-cha" of economic policy—one step toward rebalancing, two steps back toward the old model—making any true shift short-lived.

Headline GDP figures can be misleading in an environment of high immigration and inflation. Metrics like per-capita energy consumption or the number of labor hours needed to afford goods provide a more accurate picture of individual well-being, revealing that many feel poorer despite positive official growth numbers.

Including government employment in GDP calculations is a form of double-counting tax revenue that masks the true health of the private sector. A major reduction in federal workers would reveal a startlingly low real growth rate, exposing decades of underlying economic stagnation.

The massive capex spending on AI data centers is less about clear ROI and more about propping up the economy. Similar to how China built empty cities to fuel its GDP, tech giants are building vast digital infrastructure. This creates a bubble that keeps economic indicators positive and aligns incentives, even if the underlying business case is unproven.

The immense profitability of real estate in China created a gravitational pull for capital and talent. Productive companies diverted resources to start real estate side-businesses, and entrepreneurs abandoned other sectors, resulting in a net drag on national productivity and innovation.