China reports 5% real GDP growth while experiencing persistent deflation. This is historically unprecedented for an investment-led economy, with the only possible parallel being the 19th-century U.S. The inconsistency suggests official growth numbers are not credible.
Independent research firm Rhodium Group argues China's official GDP data is unrealistically stable and overstates growth. By analyzing expenditure-side components, they estimate recent growth has averaged closer to 2-3%, reflecting the severe property sector collapse.
Traditional analysis links real GDP growth to corporate profits. However, in an inflationary period, strong nominal growth can flow directly to revenues and boost profits even if real output contracts, especially if wage growth lags. This makes nominal figures a better indicator for equity markets.
China's economic success is driven by a small, hyper-competitive private sector (the top 5%). This masks a much larger, dysfunctional morass of state-owned enterprises, leading to declining overall capital productivity despite headline-grabbing advances.
China's policy to combat deflation focuses on cutting excess industrial capacity. However, this is deemed insufficient because the root cause is weak aggregate demand. A sustainable solution requires boosting consumption through social welfare, an approach policymakers seem hesitant to implement on a large scale.
China’s economic strategy prioritizes technology and manufacturing competitiveness, assuming this will create a virtuous cycle of profits, jobs, and consumption. The key risk is that automated, high-tech manufacturing may not generate enough jobs to significantly boost household income, causing consumer spending to lag behind industrial growth.
Despite strong export-led growth in Asia, the benefits did not trickle down to households. Weak household income and consumption prompted governments and central banks to implement fiscal support and monetary easing. This disconnect between headline GDP and domestic demand is a critical factor for understanding Asian economic policy.
In response to deflation and eroding profits from hyper-competition, the Chinese government's "anti-evolution" policy is a deliberate strategy to force consolidation, reduce overcapacity, and restore pricing power, thereby boosting corporate return on equity.
Despite rhetoric about shifting to a consumption-led economy, China's rigid annual GDP growth targets make this impossible. This political necessity forces a constant return to state-driven fixed asset investment to hit the numbers. The result is a "cha-cha" of economic policy—one step toward rebalancing, two steps back toward the old model—making any true shift short-lived.
Headline GDP figures can be misleading in an environment of high immigration and inflation. Metrics like per-capita energy consumption or the number of labor hours needed to afford goods provide a more accurate picture of individual well-being, revealing that many feel poorer despite positive official growth numbers.
The dramatic drop in China's Fixed Asset Investment isn't a sign of economic failure. Instead, it reflects a deliberate government-led "anti-involution" campaign to strip out industrial overcapacity. This painful but planned adjustment aims to create a more streamlined, profitable economy, fundamentally reordering its growth model away from sheer volume.