Russia portrays NATO's growth as an aggressive act of encirclement. This narrative, however, ignores that Eastern European nations eagerly joined NATO for protection, driven by Russia's long and brutal history of posing an existential threat to its neighbors. The expansion was defensive, not offensive.
Related Insights
Historically, Russia and China's strategy as continental empires involves avoiding two-front wars and actively destabilizing neighboring states. This creates buffer zones and prevents any single power from becoming a threat on their borders, ensuring their own security through regional instability.
Putin's history shows a reliable pattern: he appears cooperative and makes agreements, only to later act in his own self-interest. To predict his moves in conflicts like the Ukraine war, one must analyze this long-term behavioral pattern rather than his current statements or gestures.
Both nations use nationalism to rally support and distract from domestic failings. But this approach is a "heady drink" with severe downsides: it repels internal minorities, pushes neighbors to form counter-alliances, and makes it politically difficult to de-escalate international crises.
With the U.S. stepping back from its traditional leadership role, European countries are creating new, direct alliances to ensure their own security. A notable example is the emerging UK-Scandinavia-Baltic-Poland axis, which signals a fundamental shift in the continent's geopolitical architecture away from a singular reliance on Washington.
The core national anxieties of Russia and China are opposites, shaping their strategic cultures. Russia's history of devastating invasions fuels its fear of external threats (the "Mongol yoke"). China, haunted by centuries of civil war, fears internal chaos and the collapse of the state above all else.
Soviet leaders who lived through WWII understood the unpredictability of direct conflict and preferred proxy wars. Vladimir Putin, in contrast, has consistently used direct "hot wars"—from Chechnya to Georgia to Ukraine—as a primary tool to consolidate power and boost his domestic popularity.
In Russia, nominally private companies like Gazprom function as direct extensions of the state. Their international investments are designed not just for profit but to achieve geopolitical goals, creating a system where foreign policy, business interests, and the personal wealth of the ruling class are completely inseparable.
After WWII, the U.S. used its naval dominance to guarantee global trade. In exchange for writing its allies' security policies, it allowed open access to its market. This economic "unfairness" was the strategic cost of building a global coalition against the Soviet Union, effectively bribing nations into an alliance.
The most significant point of friction for ordinary Chinese citizens is the constant U.S. military presence near its borders, such as naval patrols in the Taiwan Strait and bases in South Korea and Japan. This sense of being militarily encircled is a more potent source of public frustration than economic disputes.
A multinational peacekeeping force from BRICS countries (China, India, Brazil, etc.) could be more effective in conflicts like the Russia-Ukraine war. The rationale is that these nations are seen as more neutral than NATO and hold significant economic leverage (e.g., as major buyers of Russian energy), making them a credible guarantee against further aggression.