General Partners (GPs) prioritize speed and certainty when allocating co-investment opportunities. LPs who build a reputation for fast, reliable decision-making can punch far above their weight, gaining access to deals disproportionate to their fund commitment size.

The private equity demand for speed is counterproductive without a foundation of trust and alignment. Trying to move fast on a weak base leads to fragility: constant busyness, recurring problems, and disengagement. True, sustainable speed is an outcome of trust, not a standalone goal.

Early-stage startups can't afford to be strung along by enterprise prospects. The goal isn't just to close deals, but to get feedback quickly. Founders must design a sales process that forces a decision, because a "long maybe will kill you." It's better to get a fast "no" and move on.

Inspired by investor Naval Ravikant, when a prospect shows significant friction or asks too many foundational questions late in the process, it signals a poor fit. Rather than forcing the sale, confidently state that the timing seems wrong and propose tabling the discussion. This builds authority and preserves relationships.

An investor's best career P&L winners are not immediate yeses. They often involve an initial pass by either the investor or the company. This shows that timing and building relationships over multiple rounds can be more crucial than a single early-stage decision, as a 'missed round' isn't a 'missed company'.

When turning down a deal, private equity professionals often tell the investment banker, "We just don't have a unique angle." This is a catch-all phrase that allows them to pass on an opportunity without providing specific, potentially contentious feedback. It's a standard, diplomatic way to exit a deal process while preserving the relationship with the banker.

Unlike private equity, where big wins can offset losses, credit investing has an asymmetric return profile: the upside is a modest coupon, while the downside is a total loss. This means investors must be right nearly 100% of the time, demanding a culture where any ambiguity or "hair" on a deal results in a swift "no."

Citing Paul Graham, Peterson states that founders should disregard the justifications VCs give for passing on a deal. The probability that the VC is being truthful, multiplied by the probability that their reasoning is correct, is so low that the feedback contains almost no signal.

Investors can be non-committal. To cut through ambiguity, founders must create a forcing function by directly asking for the term sheet. If the investor stalls or deflects, it's a negative signal, and the founder should move on.