Sprinkles' failure under private equity ownership wasn't just due to a fading fad. The PE model, which requires sustainable and predictable businesses (like car washes), is fundamentally incompatible with fad-driven, occasion-based products like gourmet cupcakes.
Capital has become commoditized with thousands of PE firms competing. The old model of buying low and selling high with minor tweaks no longer works. True value creation has shifted to hands-on operational improvements that drive long-term growth, a skill many investors lack.
The risk-return profile for a beverage brand mirrors a venture-style investment: it requires significant capital with a high failure rate, but the few successes yield massive, multi-billion dollar outcomes. This differs from food or beauty, which offer more predictable, traditional private equity returns.
Preparing a company for acquisition can lead founders to make short-term decisions that please the acquirer but undermine the brand's core agility, setting it up for failure post-sale. The focus shifts from longevity to a transaction.
During hype cycles, massive venture funding allows startups to offer products below cost to capture market share. If the company fails to achieve a high-value exit, the Limited Partner's capital has effectively been transferred to consumers in the form of discounts, without generating a financial return for the investors.
Sonder's bankruptcy wasn't due to its core idea of a standardized home rental, which was sound. The failure stemmed from raising too much venture capital ($680M), which created immense pressure for hyper-growth. This forced the company to sign unprofitable leases, proving a good business can be destroyed by the wrong funding model and unrealistic expectations.
The core value of an exclusive club is its scarcity and curated membership—qualities that are eroded by the public market's demand for constant, scalable growth. Going public forces a conflict between the brand's promise and shareholder expectations.
For years, founders of profitable but slow-growing SaaS companies could rely on a private equity acquisition as a viable exit. That safety net is gone. PE firms are now just as wary of AI disruption and growth decay as VCs, leaving many 'pretty good' SaaS companies with no buyers.
Unlike venture capital, which relies on a few famous home runs, private equity success is built on a different model. It involves consistently executing "blocking and tackling" to achieve 3-4x returns on obscure industrial or service businesses that the public has never heard of.
The company's breakthrough, and its highest-grossing business segment, was the Cupcake ATM. This highlights that revolutionary growth can come from innovating on product access and delivery, rather than just the core product itself.
When a private equity investment thesis is primarily built around a single person (e.g., a star CEO), it's a sign of weak conviction in the underlying business. If that person fails or leaves, the entire rationale for the investment collapses, revealing a lack of fundamental belief in the company's industry or competitive position.