In the current AI hype cycle, a common mistake is valuing startups as if they've already achieved massive growth, rather than basing valuation on actual, demonstrated traction. This "paying ahead of growth" leads to inflated valuations and high risk, a lesson from previous tech booms and busts.
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A market bifurcation is underway where investors prioritize AI startups with extreme growth rates over traditional SaaS companies. This creates a "changing of the guard," forcing established SaaS players to adopt AI aggressively or risk being devalued as legacy assets, while AI-native firms command premium valuations.
Contrary to the popular belief that failing to adopt AI is the biggest risk, some companies may be harming their value by developing AI practices too quickly. The market and client needs may not be ready for advanced AI integration, leading to a misallocation of resources and slower-than-expected returns.
Today's massive AI company valuations are based on market sentiment ("vibes") and debt-fueled speculation, not fundamentals, just like the 1999 internet bubble. The market will likely crash when confidence breaks, long before AI's full potential is realized, wiping out many companies but creating immense wealth for those holding the survivors.
The current AI spending spree by tech giants is historically reminiscent of the railroad and fiber-optic bubbles. These eras saw massive, redundant capital investment based on technological promise, which ultimately led to a crash when it became clear customers weren't willing to pay for the resulting products.
The current AI boom isn't just another tech bubble; it's a "bubble with bigger variance." The potential for massive upswings is matched by the risk of equally significant downswings. Investors and founders must have an unusually high tolerance for risk and volatility to succeed.
The most dangerous venture stage is the "breakout" middle ground ($500M-$2B valuations). This segment is flooded with capital, leading firms to write large checks into companies that may not have durable product-market fit. This creates a high risk of capital loss, as companies are capitalized as if they are already proven winners.
Current AI investment patterns mirror the "round-tripping" seen in the late '90s tech bubble. For example, NVIDIA invests billions in a startup like OpenAI, which then uses that capital to purchase NVIDIA chips. This creates an illusion of demand and inflated valuations, masking the lack of real, external customer revenue.
For a proven, hyper-growth AI company, traditional business risks (market, operational, tech) are minimal. The sole risk for a late-stage investor is overpaying for several years of future growth that may decelerate faster than anticipated.
While AI investment has exploded, US productivity has barely risen. Valuations are priced as if a societal transformation is complete, yet 95% of GenAI pilots fail to positively impact company P&Ls. This gap between market expectation and real-world economic benefit creates systemic risk.
AI startups' explosive growth ($1M to $100M ARR in 2 years) will make venture's power law even more extreme. LPs may need a new evaluation model, underwriting VCs across "bundles of three funds" where they expect two modest performers (e.g., 1.5x) and one massive outlier (10x) to drive overall returns.
