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Around 2018, the surging demand for separately managed accounts (SMAs) was a key symptom of the "factory model." This structure allowed asset managers to accelerate fundraising by raising vast, simple pools of capital from institutional channels, prioritizing speed and scale.

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Public markets rewarding asset managers with 25-30x+ multiples on fee-related earnings (FRE) created a powerful incentive to prioritize AUM growth over performance. This valuation arbitrage fueled the "factory model" of industrialized asset gathering to maximize stable management fee profits.

After the 2008 crisis, 95% of new hedge fund allocations went to firms with over $5B AUM. This made organic growth for smaller managers nearly impossible. Acquiring other GPs became the only viable strategy to achieve necessary scale, track records, and LP relationships.

A hybrid evergreen fundraising model, combining periodic standard funds with continuous managed accounts, eliminates fundraising cliffs. This allows a firm to deploy capital counter-cyclically, buying when assets are on sale, rather than being forced to deploy or liquidate based on an artificial timeline.

The traditional asset management industry's product development is structurally flawed. Firms often launch numerous funds and market only the one that performs well, a "spaghetti cannon" approach. Products are designed by what a "car salesman" thinks can be sold, prioritizing upfront commissions over sound investment opportunities.

The "factory model" describes an industry shift where firms industrialize fundraising to raise capital as fast as possible. This forces a subsequent industrialization of investing, where rapid deployment and lower underwriting standards take precedence over artisanal, returns-focused investing.

As venture capital firms scale to manage billions, their business model shifts from the 'artisan craft' of early-stage investing to an industrial process of asset gathering. This makes it difficult to focus on small, early opportunities and will likely result in IRRs that are no better than the industry average.

The only effective antidote to the "factory model's" gravitational pull is a firm's unwavering clarity of purpose. This means consciously prioritizing long-term investor outcomes and maintaining underwriting discipline, even if it means saying no to raising easy capital.

Increased retail access to alternatives helps level the playing field between individual and institutional investors. However, capturing this opportunity favors large, scaled managers like Blackstone and Apollo who can afford brand marketing and distribution. This dynamic accelerates industry consolidation, widening the gap between mega-firms and smaller managers.

Seed funds that primarily act as a supply chain for Series A investors—optimizing for quick markups rather than fundamental value—are failing. This 'factory model' pushes them into the hyper-competitive 'white hot center' of the market, where deals are priced to perfection and outlier returns are rare.

Large asset managers need new products to sell to their vast client networks, making mid-sized firms prime acquisition targets. This trend will lead to consolidation where the biggest firms get bigger by buying differentiated, middle-market managers, creating a landscape of giants and niche boutiques.

The Rise of SMAs in 2018 Signaled the "Factory Model's" Ascent | RiffOn