Despite accumulating massive deposits (100 trillion RMB), Chinese households are reluctant to spend. This is driven by the need to "self-insure" due to a limited social safety net and concerns over wealth destruction from the property downturn. Boosting consumption requires structural policy changes, not just stimulus.

Policies designed to avoid economic downturns at all costs can lead to significant long-term risks. Capital and labor become trapped in inefficient companies that would otherwise fail, hindering productivity growth and creating a less dynamic economy.

After a decade of zero rates and QE post-2008, the financial system can no longer function without continuous stimulus. Attempts to tighten policy, as seen with the 2018 repo crisis, immediately cause breakdowns, forcing central banks to reverse course and indicating a permanent state of intervention.

China reports 5% real GDP growth while experiencing persistent deflation. This is historically unprecedented for an investment-led economy, with the only possible parallel being the 19th-century U.S. The inconsistency suggests official growth numbers are not credible.

China's economic success is driven by a small, hyper-competitive private sector (the top 5%). This masks a much larger, dysfunctional morass of state-owned enterprises, leading to declining overall capital productivity despite headline-grabbing advances.

China's economic structure, which funnels state-backed capital into sectors like EVs, inherently creates overinvestment and excess capacity. This distorted cost of capital leads to hyper-competitive industries, making it difficult for even successful companies to generate predictable, growing returns for shareholders.

The widely reported collapse of China's housing market is not an organic crisis but a state-directed reallocation of capital. By instructing banks to prioritize industrial capacity over mortgages, the government is deliberately shifting funds away from a speculative real estate bubble and into strategic sectors like microchips to counter US sanctions and build self-sufficiency.

Despite rhetoric about shifting to a consumption-led economy, China's rigid annual GDP growth targets make this impossible. This political necessity forces a constant return to state-driven fixed asset investment to hit the numbers. The result is a "cha-cha" of economic policy—one step toward rebalancing, two steps back toward the old model—making any true shift short-lived.

The dramatic drop in China's Fixed Asset Investment isn't a sign of economic failure. Instead, it reflects a deliberate government-led "anti-involution" campaign to strip out industrial overcapacity. This painful but planned adjustment aims to create a more streamlined, profitable economy, fundamentally reordering its growth model away from sheer volume.