VCs offering capital without a board seat frame it as founder-friendly control. However, it's often a self-serving strategy that allows the firm to deploy more capital with less hands-on work, robbing founders of a dedicated partner for governance and strategy.
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Unlike in private equity, an early-stage venture investment is a bet on the founder. If an early advisor, IP holder, or previous investor holds significant control, it creates friction and hinders the CEO's ability to execute. QED's experience shows that these situations are untenable and should be avoided.
With high partner turnover at large venture firms, a key diligence question for founders is whether the specific partner joining their board is likely to remain at that firm. A partner's departure can be highly disruptive, making their stability more important than firm brand.
The abundance of capital has shifted the VC mindset from serving founders over a decade to simply "winning" the next hot deal. This transactional approach is misaligned with what founders truly need: a committed, long-term partner who puts the company first.
Beyond product-market fit, there is "Founder-Capital Fit." Some founders thrive with infinite capital, while for others it creates a moral hazard, leading to a loss of focus and an inability to make hard choices. An investor's job is to discern which type of founder they're backing before deploying capital that could inadvertently ruin the company.
When fundraising, the most critical choice isn't the VC fund's brand but the specific partner who will join the board. Sophisticated founders vet the individual's strengths, weaknesses, and working style, as that person has a more direct impact on the company than the firm's logo on a term sheet.
The pervasive trend of VCs being "founder-friendly" often manifests as "hypocritical politeness" that withholds crucial, direct feedback. This ultimately hurts the company. Strong founders don't select for niceness; they seek partners who provide brutally honest input to help them improve.
Mark Cuban highlights the conflict for founders with VC funding: VCs need rapid growth for an exit, which can force founders into risky decisions that dilute equity below 50% and risk the company's long-term health.
Horowitz argues that forgoing a board is a massive legal risk for CEOs. A board's primary function is to provide a legal shield. Running material decisions, like equity grants, past the board protects the CEO from personal liability and lawsuits from shareholders. Without this process, founders are dangerously exposed.
The rise of founder-optimized fundraising—raising smaller, more frequent rounds to minimize dilution—is systematically eroding traditional VC ownership models. What is a savvy capital strategy for a founder directly translates into a VC failing to meet their ownership targets, creating a fundamental conflict in the ecosystem.
The conventional wisdom that a VC can only handle ~8 board seats is incorrect for firms with a strong platform. When a firm provides dedicated teams for recruiting, business development, and policy, partners can scale their time effectively. They are freed to focus on high-leverage strategic advice, not operational tasks.