Beijing’s core strategy for Taiwan is to convince its populace that "resistance is futile" and no outside help is coming. U.S. arms sales and rhetorical support from allies are particularly disruptive because they directly counter this psychological narrative of isolation, undermining China's goal of a coerced unification.

The most effective deterrent to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan isn't more U.S. technology, but a political commitment from Japan to fight from day one. Japan could bring significant military mass to the conflict in just two to three days, compared to the weeks required for U.S. forces.

Strengthening Taiwan's own defense capabilities directly reduces the risk and burden on US forces in a potential conflict. Dollar for dollar, investing in Taiwan's military could be a more efficient use of funds for US security interests than simply adding more to the US budget.

Banning chip sales to China reduces its reliance on Taiwan's TSMC, lowering the economic cost of an invasion. Resuming sales re-establishes this crucial economic link, creating a powerful disincentive for conflict and acting as a geopolitical stabilizer, despite seeming counterintuitive to gaining a direct AI advantage.

Contrary to popular comparisons with Ukraine, Taiwan has 'zero chance' of defending itself independently. Its entire military posture is designed to hold out long enough for the United States to intervene, not to win a war of self-defense. This makes U.S. intervention speed the critical factor.

Learning from Ukraine's resistance against Russia, Taiwan is shifting its defense strategy from relying on large US arms packages to developing its own indigenous, asymmetric capabilities like drones, anti-ship missiles, and sea mines to counter a numerically superior Chinese force.

The United States' most powerful and asymmetric advantage over China is not military hardware, but its global network of allies and partners. Effective deterrence hinges on convincing Beijing it would face a broad, multi-front coalition—militarily and economically—not just a bilateral conflict with the U.S.

Focusing solely on deterring a military invasion of Taiwan is insufficient. The US must develop capabilities to counter China's gray zone tactics and manage the economic fallout of a crisis. Failure to do so could lead to a US concession and a Chinese victory without a shot being fired.

This strategy involves supplying Ukraine only with defensive systems (like air defense) during peacetime. Offensive capabilities (long-range missiles) would be stockpiled nearby and immediately provided if Russia violates the ceasefire, creating a powerful incentive for compliance.