A common inefficiency at large funds is under-scaling proven internal talent. Stephen Gilmore found that CalPERS' own equity and fixed income teams produced high information ratios but were hamstrung by active risk constraints, preventing the fund from fully capitalizing on its most successful, in-house alpha-generating strategies.
When David Swenson published the "Yale Model," many institutions tried to copy it without possessing Yale's resources, network, or manager selection expertise. This led many to chase private equity and hedge funds ill-equipped, resulting in them backing lower-quartile managers and achieving poor results.
Australia's massive $4T pension system has structural biases towards internal management and passive investing. This has led to a slower adoption of alternative strategies, creating a less efficient market where specialized managers like Regal Partners can generate significant alpha.
The highly successful NZ Superfund derives its value from a few large, high-conviction strategic bets where it has a unique edge, rejecting the conventional wisdom of broad global diversification for large asset owners.
There's a surprising disconnect between the perceived brilliance of individual investors at large, well-known private equity firms and their actual net-to-LP returns, which are often no better than the market median. This violates the assumption that top talent automatically generates outlier results.
The central task for capital allocators is to identify investment managers with a proven, durable edge—be it in sourcing, operations, or strategy—that allows them to consistently capture alpha in markets that are otherwise becoming more efficient.
Superior returns can come from a firm's structure, not just its stock picks. By designing incentive systems and processes that eliminate 'alpha drags'—like short-term pressures, misaligned compensation, and herd behavior—a firm can create a durable, structural competitive advantage that boosts performance.
A pure TPA system can alienate specialists hired for specific asset classes. A hybrid model, where a portion of capital is allocated to traditional buckets, allows organizations to retain deep expertise in areas like private equity while still gaining the benefits of a holistic TPA overlay on the rest.
The key question for institutions isn't "how do we access the best managers?" but "what is unique about us that facilitates privileged access to assets or managers?" This shifts the focus from picking to leveraging inherent advantages.
Challenging the famous Brinson paper, Ashby Monk argues that an investor's ability to execute a strategy is paramount. The decision to invest in illiquid assets is meaningless without the internal people, processes, and information systems to support it. Therefore, 100% of performance is a function of these organizational capabilities.
Shifting capital between asset classes based on relative value is powerful but operationally difficult. It demands a "coordination tax"—a significant organizational effort to ensure different teams price risk comparably and collaborate. This runs counter to the industry's typical siloed, product-focused structure.