The use of SAFEs has expanded beyond pre-seed, becoming the dominant instrument for rounds up to $4M that were historically priced. This trend simplifies closing a round but creates significant downstream complexity when calculating ownership for employee stock option grants and future rounds.
A massive valuation for a "seed" round can be misleading. Often, insiders have participated in several unannounced, cheaper tranches. The headline number is just the final, most expensive tier, used to create FOMO and set a high watermark for new investors.
ElevenLabs raised a $100M round entirely for employee secondaries. The CEO's rationale is that by allowing early team members to de-risk and realize financial gains, it solidifies their commitment to the company's multi-year mission rather than creating pressure for a quick exit.
Mega-funds can justify paying "stupid prices" at the seed stage because they aren't underwriting a seed-stage return. Instead, they are buying an option on the next, much larger round where they'll deploy real capital. This allows them to outbid smaller funds who need to generate returns from the initial investment itself.
Raise capital when you can clearly see upcoming growth and need resources to service it. Tying your timeline to operational milestones, like onboarding new customers, creates genuine urgency and momentum. This drives investor FOMO and helps close deals more effectively than an arbitrary deadline.
Y Combinator's model pushes companies to raise at high valuations, often bypassing traditional seed rounds. Simultaneously, mega-funds cherry-pick the most proven founders at prices seed funds cannot compete with. This leaves traditional seed funds fighting for a narrowing and less attractive middle ground.
Seed-focused funds have a powerful, non-obvious advantage over multi-stage giants: incentive alignment. A seed fund's goal is to maximize the next round's valuation for the founder. A multi-stage firm, hoping to lead the next round themselves, is implicitly motivated to keep that valuation lower, creating a conflict of interest.
Investors like Stacy Brown-Philpot and Aileen Lee now expect founders to demonstrate a clear, rapid path to massive scale early on. The old assumption that the next funding round would solve for scalability is gone; proof is required upfront.
The rise of founder-optimized fundraising—raising smaller, more frequent rounds to minimize dilution—is systematically eroding traditional VC ownership models. What is a savvy capital strategy for a founder directly translates into a VC failing to meet their ownership targets, creating a fundamental conflict in the ecosystem.
Historically, a bridge round signaled a company was struggling. Now, this signal is split. A new class of 'bridge' is emerging as a pre-emptive investment from enthusiastic investors wanting to deploy more capital into a fast-growing company before its official priced round, making it a positive indicator in some cases.
The number of founders taking secondary liquidity after their seed round is twice as high as the 2021 peak. While this de-risks the journey for founders, there is almost no parallel liquidity offered to early employees, creating a growing divide in early-stage risk and reward.