In China, mayors and governors are promoted based on their ability to meet national priorities. As AI safety becomes a central government goal, these local leaders are now incentivized to create experimental zones and novel regulatory approaches, driving bottom-up policy innovation that can later be adopted nationally.

A key, informal safety layer against AI doom is the institutional self-preservation of the developers themselves. It's argued that labs like OpenAI or Google would not knowingly release a model they believed posed a genuine threat of overthrowing the government, opting instead to halt deployment and alert authorities.

Top Chinese officials use the metaphor "if the braking system isn't under control, you can't really step on the accelerator with confidence." This reflects a core belief that robust safety measures enable, rather than hinder, the aggressive development and deployment of powerful AI systems, viewing the two as synergistic.

China's binding regulations mean companies focus safety efforts on the 31 specific risks defined by the government. This compliance-driven approach can leave them less prepared for emergent risks like CBRN or loss of control, as resources are directed toward meeting existing legal requirements rather than proactive, voluntary measures.

In China, academics have significant influence on policymaking, partly due to a cultural tradition that highly values scholars. Experts deeply concerned about existential AI risks have briefed the highest levels of government, suggesting that policy may be less susceptible to capture by commercial tech interests compared to the West.

Instead of trying to legally define and ban 'superintelligence,' a more practical approach is to prohibit specific, catastrophic outcomes like overthrowing the government. This shifts the burden of proof to AI developers, forcing them to demonstrate their systems cannot cause these predefined harms, sidestepping definitional debates.

China remains committed to open-weight models, seeing them as beneficial for innovation. Its primary safety strategy is to remove hazardous knowledge (e.g., bioweapons information) from the training data itself. This makes the public model inherently safer, rather than relying solely on post-training refusal mechanisms that can be circumvented.

An FDA-style regulatory model would force AI companies to make a quantitative safety case for their models before deployment. This shifts the burden of proof from regulators to creators, creating powerful financial incentives for labs to invest heavily in safety research, much like pharmaceutical companies invest in clinical trials.

While the U.S. leads in closed, proprietary AI models like OpenAI's, Chinese companies now dominate the leaderboards for open-source models. Because they are cheaper and easier to deploy, these Chinese models are seeing rapid global uptake, challenging the U.S.'s perceived lead in AI through wider diffusion and application.