In China, academics have significant influence on policymaking, partly due to a cultural tradition that highly values scholars. Experts deeply concerned about existential AI risks have briefed the highest levels of government, suggesting that policy may be less susceptible to capture by commercial tech interests compared to the West.

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Contrary to common Western assumptions, China's official AI blueprint focuses on practical applications like scientific discovery and industrial transformation, with no mention of AGI or superintelligence. This suggests a more grounded, cautious approach aimed at boosting the real economy rather than winning a speculative tech race.

While U.S. advocates for AI cooperation with China often feel they are in a marginalized minority fighting a hawkish narrative, their counterparts in China feel their position is mainstream. Chinese academia, industry, and think tanks broadly view international governance collaboration as a priority, not just an acceptable option.

In China, mayors and governors are promoted based on their ability to meet national priorities. As AI safety becomes a central government goal, these local leaders are now incentivized to create experimental zones and novel regulatory approaches, driving bottom-up policy innovation that can later be adopted nationally.

Top Chinese officials use the metaphor "if the braking system isn't under control, you can't really step on the accelerator with confidence." This reflects a core belief that robust safety measures enable, rather than hinder, the aggressive development and deployment of powerful AI systems, viewing the two as synergistic.

Unlike the Western discourse, which is often framed as a race to achieve AGI by a certain date, the Chinese AI community has significantly less discussion of specific AGI timelines or a clear "finish line." The focus is on technological self-sufficiency, practical applications, and commercial success.

The justification for accelerating AI development to beat China is logically flawed. It assumes the victor wields a controllable tool. In reality, both nations are racing to build the same uncontrollable AI, making the race itself, not the competitor, the primary existential threat.

The argument that the U.S. must race to build superintelligence before China is flawed. The Chinese Communist Party's primary goal is control. An uncontrollable AI poses a direct existential threat to their power, making them more likely to heavily regulate or halt its development rather than recklessly pursue it.

Chinese policymakers champion AI as a key driver of economic productivity but appear to be underestimating its potential for social upheaval. There is little indication they are planning for the mass displacement of the gig economy workforce, who will be the first casualties of automation. This focus on technological gains over social safety nets creates a significant future political risk.

For Chinese policymakers, AI is more than a productivity tool; it represents a crucial opportunity to escape the middle-income trap. They are betting that leadership in AI can fuel the innovation needed to transition from a labor-intensive economy to a developed one, avoiding the stagnation that has plagued other emerging markets.

The AI safety discourse in China is pragmatic, focusing on immediate economic impacts rather than long-term existential threats. The most palpable fear exists among developers, who directly experience the power of coding assistants and worry about job replacement, a stark contrast to the West's more philosophical concerns.