Initially, a16z believed only former founder-CEOs could properly advise entrepreneurs. They later realized this was flawed. Many successful founders can't articulate how they succeeded and may not be interested in the investing skillset. The firm adjusted, realizing it's better to centralize operational advice (e.g., in books and specialist partners) rather than requiring it from every GP.
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A16z's foundational belief is that founders, not hired "professional CEOs," should lead their companies long-term. The firm is structured as a network of specialists to provide founders with the knowledge and connections they lack, enabling them to grow into the CEO role and succeed.
a16z's investment philosophy is to assess founders on how world-class they are at their core strengths. Horowitz warns it's a mistake to pass on a uniquely talented founder due to fixable weaknesses (e.g., no go-to-market plan) and an equal mistake to back a less talented founder just because they lack obvious flaws.
A16Z's transformation from a small, generalist partnership to a large, specialized firm was a deliberate answer to a fundamental industry problem: the traditional partner model doesn't scale for deploying capital and making decisions in today's massive, professionalized venture market.
The expectation for venture capitalists has shifted. Founders no longer just want finance professionals; they demand investors who have direct operational experience and have been "in the trenches" of building a company. This change reflects a move towards more hands-on, value-add investing.
Many VC firms hire former operators for their expertise, but success isn't guaranteed. The best operator-VCs avoid the urge to "backseat drive" the companies they fund. Instead, they leverage their experience with extraordinary humility, acting as a supportive advisor rather than a replacement CEO.
Founders often chase executives from successful scaled companies. However, these execs can fail because their experience makes them overly critical and resistant to the painful, hands-on work required at an early stage. The right hire is often someone a few layers down from the star executive.
The hardest transition from entrepreneur to investor is curbing the instinct to solve problems and imagine "what could be." The best venture deals aren't about fixing a company but finding teams already on a trajectory to succeed, then helping change the slope of that success line on the margin.
Lior Susan highlights the biggest mental hurdle for former operators becoming VCs: internalizing the power law. Operators are builders wired to fix problems and believe they can turn any situation around. In VC, success is driven by a few massive outliers, requiring focus on winners, not on fixing every company.
The transition from a C-suite operator managing thousands to an investor is jarring. New VCs must adapt from leading large teams to being individual contributors who write their own memos and do their own sourcing. This "scaling down" ability, not just prior success, predicts their success as an investor.
Venture capital should focus on what a founder does exceptionally well, rather than penalizing them for past failures or weaknesses. Ben Horowitz uses the Adam Neumann example to illustrate their principle: judge people by their spectacular talents (like building the WeWork brand) and help them manage their flaws, which is a more effective strategy than seeking perfectly flawless individuals.
